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DUE PROCESS AND THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM IN 
ELDER LAW DISPUTES: WHICH HAT WILL SHE DON 
WITH HER CLOAK OF NEUTRALITY? 
Roger A. Eddleman* & John A. DiNucci** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, the Associated Press conducted a nation-wide study 
exposing abuses of the elderly by their own guardians.1  One 
notable instance involved an eighty-three-year-old woman 
whose adult daughter had been appointed as guardian.2  The 
 
* Roger A. Eddleman, J.D., LL.M., is an attorney in private practice in 
McLean, Virginia. He graduated from American University, B.A., 
Antioch Law School, J.D., and Georgetown University Law Center, 
LL.M., in Securities Regulation.  He is licensed in California (since 
1989) and Virginia (since 1986). Mr. Eddleman focuses on civil 
litigation, including trust and estate litigation, guardianship and 
conservatorship issues, and commercial disputes. 
** John A. DiNucci, J.D., is an attorney in the private practice of law in 
McLean, Virginia.  He graduated With High Distinction from the 
University of Virginia in 1978 with a B.A. in Government.  He 
graduated With Honors from the George Washington University Law 
School in 1983.  He is licensed to practice law in Maryland, New York, 
Virginia and Washington, D.C. and has practiced law for 28 years.  He 
has extensive experience in various fields of civil litigation, including 
adult guardianship and conservatorship litigation, fiduciary litigation 
and trust and estate litigation. 
 1. Jamie L. Leary, Note, A Review of Two Recently Reformed Guardianship 
Statutes: Balancing the Need to Protect Individuals Who Cannot Protect Themselves 
Against the Need to Guard Individual Autonomy, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 245, 246 
(1997).   
 2. Id. at n.10.  “Guardian” is to be distinguished from guardian ad litem.  A 
guardian is a person who is appointed to care for the personal needs and oversee 
the welfare of an incapacitated person, while a guardian ad litem, in the context of 
this article, is an attorney appointed by a court for purposes of litigation involving 
the putative incapacitated person who is the ward of the court during the 
proceeding.    
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elderly woman was found in a urine-soaked bed, suffering from 
malnutrition and dehydration.  The grandchildren referred to 
her as “Fido,” feeding her once a day.  The daughter, however, 
never failed to cash her mother’s Social Security checks.3 
The Associated Press’s study resulted in national attention 
concerning the plight of the elderly.4  In 1997, Virginia enacted 
its guardianship and conservatorship statute5 (the “Statute”) 
patterned after the Uniform Guardianship and Protective 
Proceedings Act. 
 
 3. Id.  
 4. Subsequent studies revealed that the elderly did not fare well in the judicial 
system either.  In a substantial number of cases they were deemed to be 
incapacitated resulting in a loss of freedom without legal representation and 
without being present at any stage of the proceedings.  In most instances the cases 
involve allegations that an elderly person cannot properly function and take care of 
themselves or their interests because of disabilities brought on by Alzheimer’s 
disease, a chronic and slowly progressive disorder that is irreversible.  In the Matter 
of Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citation 
omitted).  According to one study there will be 360,000 or more new cases of the 
disease every year.  Id.  According to Campbell v. Thomas, 73 A.D.3d 103, n.1 (N.Y. 
Ct. App. 2010), one study found that in approximately 65% of substantiated cases of 
elder abuse, the offender was a family member of the victim, including his or her 
adult child, spouse, or intimate partner.  As far back as 1984, one court referred to 
cases involving elderly abuse as “an all-too-familiar modern tragedy.”  Bergman v. 
Serns, 443 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983).  In Hayes v. Thompson, 952 So. 2d 498, 
501 (Fla. 2006), the elderly ward of the court was the victim of multiple abuses by 
her nephew and sister who were responsible for the ward’s financial and medical 
needs.  The ward’s living conditions at the nephew’s home were “deplorable” to the 
extent of placing her in danger.  Id.  In Groves, the eighty-eight-year-old ward 
suffered at the hands of relatives who “brainwashed” her in order to take, among 
other things, financial advantage of her; once that was accomplished she was placed 
in a nursing home.  109 S.W.3d at 324.  In In re Guardianship of Santrucek, 896 N.E.2d 
683, 689 (Oh. 2008), a ninety-six-year-old ward had been removed from her 
Michigan home and forced to live out the rest of her life in a “strange location.”  In 
another typical case, a ward’s children had moved her from Ohio to Florida during 
a time when her health was at risk, concealed the ward’s location, transferred her 
accounts and assets into joint ownership, sold her assets and used the proceeds for 
their personal use, and so forth.  Thorpe v. Myers, 67 So. 3d 338, 340 (Fla. Ct. App. 
2011).  (If one is unfamiliar with this area of law and the issues involved, the Groves 
decision is perhaps the best case for becoming initiated.  It is a lengthy opinion with 
134 footnotes, addressing a plethora of factual, legal, and medical issues typically 
involved in such cases.) 
 5. 1997 Va. Acts 921.  Title 37.2 of the Virginia Code, “Behavioral Health and 
Developmental Services,” consists of eleven chapters; chapter ten, “Guardianship 
and Conservatorship,” embodies the totality of the Statute at issue in this article.  
VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 37.2-1000–37.2-1030 (2012).  It should be noted that the Statute 
addresses not only the elderly but all physically and/or mentally incapacitated 
persons who cannot properly care for themselves or their property.   
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One of the primary means of protecting the elderly (the 
“Respondent”6 or “ward”) involves the appointment of a lawyer 
as guardian ad litem (“GAL”).7  Unlike any other person, party, 
or witness in any type of litigation, the GAL’s role is expansive.8  
They state, often not under oath, their personal beliefs and 
opinions regarding legal and factual issues reaching directly to 
the heart of the proceedings.9  On those occasions when GALs 
testify, they may not be subject to cross-examination.  The GAL’s 
role is well-intentioned and grounded in part on judicial 
convenience.  A GAL acts as the court’s eyes and ears.  She is 
appointed, inter alia, under the Statute and pursuant to a court’s 
inherent equitable powers.10  The GAL reports her findings to 
the trial court after investigating virtually all the facts and legal 
 
 6. As discussed below, the Statute denominates the subject or putative ward 
in the proceeding as a “Respondent.” VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1000. 
 7. Although the Statute sets forth several definitions, including “guardian” 
and “conservator,” significantly it does not define a guardian ad litem.  Id.  
Apparently, the General Assembly concluded that the term was adequately defined 
by common law.  Notably, in some states, a GAL need not be an attorney.  In 
Virginia that is not the case; a GAL must be a licensed Virginia attorney.  §§ 8.01-9, 
16.1-266.1. 
 8. § 37.2-1003 (B).  While this study focuses on GALs in the elder law context, 
it should also provide guidance and insight on a GAL’s role in any context because 
irrespective of the particular statute or other authority authorizing their 
appointment, in Virginia a GAL’s obligations are generally the same.  In addition, 
although this article focuses on Virginia law, its utility is not limited to the 
Commonwealth.  By necessity, we address the GAL’s role in a number of 
jurisdictions.  Virtually all the states are struggling with the appropriate role a GAL 
plays in their respective jurisdictions.  
 9. § 37.2-1003 (B).  For example, an expert witness is allowed to testify 
concerning her opinion but cannot opine on the ultimate issue.  An attorney in 
closing can argue the facts but cannot give his personal opinion.  In contrast, a GAL 
may do all of these. 
 10. § 37.2-1003.  Standards governing a GAL’s appointment were promulgated 
by the Judicial Council of Virginia in conjunction with the Virginia State Bar and 
became effective January 1, 2009.  Standards to Govern the Appointment of Guardians 
Ad Litem for Incapacitated Persons Pursuant to Chapter 10 of Title 37.2, Code of Virginia, 
available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/cip/programs/gal/adult/ 
gal_standards_adult.pdf.  To qualify one must be an active member of the bar and 
in good standing, complete six hours of approved continuing legal education, and 
apply to be placed on an approved list of attorneys qualifying as GALs.  Id.  
Thereafter, the attorney must complete six hours of approved courses every two 
years.  The courses involve issues pertaining to elder law such as basic estate 
planning, estate administration, litigation, ethics, Medicaid, Medicare, long term 
care insurance, facility evaluation, dementia, closed head injuries, gerontology, 
mental issues, and so forth.  
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issues involved in the proceedings as set forth in the petition 
requesting the appointment of a guardian and/or conservator. 
The GAL is supposed to be neutral.  She purportedly 
renders an unbiased opinion on such matters as whether the 
Respondent needs a guardian due to mental or physical 
incapacity, the scope of the guardian’s duties, and whether the 
proposed guardian is suitable.11  Significant complications arise, 
however, when one of the parties, including the Respondent, 
disagrees with the GAL’s often devastating opinion. 
The primary concern in the context of this study involves 
human error and fallibility.  Personalities, motives, and practical 
considerations meet deficient safeguards in the form of 
inadequate judicial safeguards.  A GAL’s opinion, like any other 
witness, can be based on emotion, lack of information, or 
untrustworthy information.  To further complicate matters, the 
information GALs rely on may be based on hearsay.  Personality 
conflicts often arise and derive from the charged atmosphere of 
litigation and long-standing family conflicts.  In addition, it may 
be that the GAL has not taken the time or had the time to 
adequately investigate, resulting in ill-considered 
recommendations to the trial court.12 
A host of significant issues, not the least of which are 
constitutional in dimension, are presented given the GAL’s 
mercurial role.13  As a lawyer appointed to act in the putative 
 
 11. § 37.2-1003(C). 
 12. For example, in a ten-day trial involving Washington State’s guardianship 
statute, a GAL admitted on cross-examination that before her investigation was 
complete and before speaking with two critical witnesses, the GAL “had already 
decided that she would not recommend a guardianship.”  Endicott v. Saul, 176 P.3d 
560, 569 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008).  The GAL also testified that if she were making a 
decision based solely on the elderly woman’s testimony in court, “that she too 
might have doubts as to whether [the ward] needed a guardian.”  Id. at 568.  In an 
unpublished Tennessee opinion, a party accused the GAL of being “hand-picked” 
(biased) by the opposing side and moved to have the GAL removed.  Davenport v. 
Adair, No. E2004-01505 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2005) (unpublished). 
 13. A GAL’s role has been described as “hybrid” because she functions as an 
advocate, investigator, and advisor with duties owed to the court and to the 
putative ward.  In the Matter of M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1284 (N.J. 1994).  In M.R., the 
New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to set forth the parameters of a GAL’s 
obligations and duties, and in doing so observed that although there were 
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ward’s best interests, what role should the GAL have at trial?  
Upon receiving the trial court’s imprimatur as “neutral,” should 
the GAL be permitted to testify?  If so, what impact does that 
have on a party seeking to challenge the GAL’s opinion when 
the fact-finder has been informed that the GAL is acting for the 
best interests of the putative ward and is “neutral”?  Is it fair to 
the parties when the GAL wears two hats, an adversarial hat and 
the hat of a court advisor? 
Because most of these issues have not been addressed by 
Virginia courts, we examine authorities elsewhere.14  We 
conclude that Virginia law is unsettled, if not chaotic, and 
should be remedied by additional legislation and/or 
promulgation of Supreme Court rules. 
II.  THE STATUTE 
Virginia’s guardian and conservatorship statute is designed 
to protect those at the mercy of their own physical and/or mental 
limitations.15  The elderly are also vulnerable and frequently 
 
differences between minors and incompetent elderly persons (both requiring court-
appointed GALs), the same considerations calling for an advocacy role in the case 
of minors applied to GALs in the context of elder law proceedings.  Id.  We point 
this out because in the analysis that follows many of the court decisions derive from 
case law involving GALs appointed to represent minors in the family law context.  
This is necessary because as noted there are limited cases addressing the role of 
GALs in the elder law context.  Nevertheless, these opinions are highly instructive.  
In some respects the nature of the “disability” is irrelevant because the GAL’s 
duties and obligations are the same: they are to represent their ward’s best interests, 
whether the ward is a minor or adult.  In either event, the issues are virtually the 
same; the GAL is engaged for the benefit of someone who is incapable of making 
decisions or acting in their own best interests.    
 14. The primary issues addressed in this article can be summarized by asking 
two questions: how much of an attorney is the GAL, and how much of a client is the 
client (or ward/Respondent)?  At first blush, these questions may appear unclear. 
Nevertheless, they accurately frame the issues.  The first question can be 
reformulated: how far can the GAL go in advocating her position during the 
proceedings?  Should she be allowed to function fully as an advocate, consistent 
with her role as the eyes and ears of the court?  The second question can also be 
restated: is the putative ward the GAL’s “client” as the term “client” is used in the 
traditional attorney-client context?  Stated differently again, who is the client?  Is it 
the putative ward, is it the GAL’s “position,” or is the client the GAL herself?  As 
we will see, all of these “clients” have been identified as such by one or more 
authorities. 
 15. See Davenport v. Adair, No. E2004-01505 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2005) 
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unable to defend themselves from the false allegations of family 
members that a parent, for example, is mentally or physically 
incapacitated.16  The Statute is, therefore, designed to ensure that 
before the elderly person’s liberty or property is taken, she is in 
fact in need of protection because she is incapacitated.17 
The Statute is intentionally broad, empowering Virginia 
Circuit Courts to appoint a guardian and conservator18 to 
manage and care for the Respondent’s19 health and property. 
From the Respondent’s perspective, however, the Statute is a 
state-authorized mechanism for taking or limiting their freedom 
 
(unpublished) (“The purpose of appointing a guardian, conservator, or committee 
is to safeguard the rights of the incompetent by protecting his person and by 
managing and preserving his property.” (internal quotation omitted)).  The 
“overwhelming public policy” in guardianship proceedings is the protection of the 
ward.  Hayes v. Thompson, 952 So. 2d 498, 505 (Fla. 2006).  Guardianship 
proceedings are meant “’to promote the well-being of the disabled person, to 
protect him from neglect, exploitation, or abuse, and to encourage development of 
his maximum self-reliance and independence.’” Struck v. Cook Cnty. Pub. 
Guardian, 901 N.E.2d 946, 952 (Ill. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/11a-3(b) (2006)).   
 16. For example, see Whitmer v. Thomas, 27 Va. Cir. 202, 203–04 (1992), one of 
the few reported Virginia decisions involving the Statute.  The trial judge ordered 
the petitioners, two adult children who had instituted the proceeding to appoint a 
guardian for their mother, to pay the entirety of the GAL’s fees.  Id. at 204.  The 
children, who alleged their mother was incapable of taking care of herself, had 
three months to gather evidence supporting their allegations; however, as late as six 
days prior to trial, the children had gathered no evidence (medical or otherwise) 
documenting their mother’s alleged condition.  Id. at 203–04.  Petitioners admitted 
in deposition that their mother was not incapacitated.  Id. at 203.  The court found 
that it was “obvious” the petitioners were more concerned about preserving their 
mother’s financial assets than they were for their mother’s well-being and ordered 
they pay the GAL fees.  Id.    
 17. A number of safeguards are included in the Statute to ensure that the 
putative ward is actually incapacitated and in need of protection.  As noted, the 
Statute defines “incapacity.”  VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1000.  The court is required to 
appoint medical professionals to submit an Evaluation Report relating to the 
putative ward’s condition.  § 37.2-1005.  In addition, the GAL is required to 
investigate the full scope of the Petition’s allegations as well as the evidence, 
including the suitability of proposed guardian and/or conservator, the residential 
placement of the putative ward, and so forth.  § 37.2-1003(C). 
 18. Here, guardian is distinguished from GAL and defined by the Statute as a 
person appointed by the court to be responsible for the personal affairs of an 
incapacitated person.  § 37.2-1000.  A guardian’s responsibilities include making 
decisions regarding the elderly person’s support, care, health, safety, education and 
so forth.  Id.  By contrast, a conservator is defined as a person appointed by the 
court to manage the estate and financial affairs of an incapacitated person. Id.  
 19. The Respondent is the alleged incapacitated person for whom a petition for 
guardianship or conservatorship has been filed.  Id. 
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to live as they wish,20 jeopardizing virtually everything the 
Respondent has amassed over a lifetime.  Upon a finding of 
incapacity, they are often uprooted from their homes, 
neighborhoods, and relatives and separated from life-long 
friends. 
While the Statute is designed first and foremost to protect 
the Respondent in her person and property, the state is 
constitutionally restrained because an elderly person’s liberty 
interests are directly implicated in a guardianship proceeding.21 
When the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the 
proposed guardianship statute, the ward’s civil rights were kept 
foremost in mind.22  The Virginia statute follows suit.  First, and 
most significantly perhaps, is the requirement that a finding of 
incapacity must be based on clear and convincing evidence.23  
Second, a GAL, purportedly an independent party, is appointed 
to represent the Respondent’s interests.24  Third, the Respondent 
is entitled to be represented by an attorney of her choice.25  
 
 20. Guardianship proceedings carry “the real possibility of displacing the 
elderly person’s ability to make even the most basic decisions for themselves and to 
live their lives unfettered by the control of others.”  In the Matter of 
Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 329 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).  Persons 
deemed incapacitated face a “substantial loss of freedom.”  Id.  A guardianship can 
be a “drastic restraint on a person’s liberty.”  In the Matter of M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 
1282 (N.J. 1994) (internal quotation omitted).  
 21. In New York the guardianship statute is “[d]esigned to assure that the 
individual’s constitutional rights are fully protected . . . .”  In the Matter of Johnson, 
658 N.Y.S.2d 780, 783 (1997).  
 22. As a matter of practice and policy the courts endeavor to impose the least 
restrictive constraints on a Respondent’s liberty.  Sometime after the enactment of 
the uniform law and its adoption by a number of the states, the act was amended to 
set forth the policy that “limited” guardianships were favored.  In New York the 
statute seeks to impose the “least restrictive form of intervention.”  Johnson, 658 
N.Y.S.2d. at 783.  In Tennessee conservatorship proceedings under the statute 
require that the “least restrictive alternatives be placed upon a disabled person 
consistent with adequate protection of the individual’s person and property.” 
Groves, 109 S.W.3d at 329 (internal quotation omitted) (describing TENN. CODE. 
ANN. § 34-1-127 (2001)). 
 23. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1007.  See also Coston v. Petrie, 586 N.W.2d. 52, 61 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1998).  
 24. § 37.2-1003(A). 
 25. §§ 37.2-1006 and 37.2-1003(B)(iii).  See also Guardianship of Hocker, 791 
N.E.2d 302 (Mass. 2003).  
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Fourth, the Statute defines “incapacitated person.”26  Fifth, the 
Respondent is entitled to notice by personal service of the 
proceedings,27 to be present at all stages, and to request a jury 
trial at which she may present evidence, compel witnesses’ 
attendance, and cross-examine adverse witnesses.28 
Usually some real or feigned emergency triggers the filing 
of a Petition in circuit court.29  In many instances, an adult child 
discovers that their father’s or mother’s physical or mental 
condition has deteriorated to such an extent that the parent is in 
danger.  Quite often a family member motivated by financial 
gain files a petition, alleging that their parent is incapable of 
caring for himself and/or his property.30 
While a family member most often initiates capacity 
 
 26. § 37.2-1000:  
“Incapacitated person” means an adult who has been found by a court to 
be incapable of receiving and evaluating information effectively or 
responding to people, events, or environments to such an extent that the 
individual lacks the capacity to (i) meet the essential requirements for his 
health, care, safety, or therapeutic needs without the assistance or 
protection of a guardian or (ii) manage property or financial affairs or 
provide for his support or for the support of his legal dependents without 
the assistance or protection of a conservator. A finding that the individual 
displays poor judgment alone shall not be considered sufficient evidence 
that the individual is an incapacitated person within the meaning of this 
definition.  
 27. § 37.2-1004(B).  Section 37.2-1004(C) further requires notice of the date and 
time of the hearing be mailed at least seven days before the hearing to all adult 
individuals named in the Petition, including Respondent.  
 28. § 37.2-1007. 
 29. Section 37.2-1001(A) provides that a Petition may be filed in the county or 
city in which the Respondent is a resident or where the Respondent is located.  In a 
significant number of cases, the Respondent may have been involuntarily relocated 
by a family member to a county or city in Virginia and, therefore, is not a Virginia 
resident.  Consequently, the Statute allows any person to file a Petition where the 
Respondent is “located.”  In 2011, Virginia adopted its version of the Uniform 
Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act (Act), in part, 
because of the rash of litigation over jurisdictional disputes involving the elderly 
who are often taken from their home state (defined in the Act) and detained by 
family members against their will in another state. 
 30. So-called criminal elder abuse statutes have relatively recently been 
enacted.  Some define and include financial abuse as “elder abuse,” and convictions 
are classified as misdemeanors or felonies.  Elder abuse statutes can also encompass 
financial abuse in the civil context.  See, e.g., Steinbach v. Thomas, No. A125293 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2011) (unpublished) (discussing allegation that before his death 
plaintiff’s grandfather sold his property for less than market value as a result of 
fraud by defendant). 
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proceedings, Section 37.2-1002 provides that any person may file 
for appointment of a guardian or conservator or both.  Section 
37.2-1001 requires the petition to be filed with the circuit court in 
the county or city where the respondent/incapacitated person is 
a resident or is located. 
The Statute also specifies the Petition’s contents.  Section 
37.2-1002 requires, in part, that the Petition include the 
Petitioner’s name, place of residence and the relationship, if any, 
to the Respondent.  The Petition shall further provide: 
 1. The respondent’s name, date of birth, place of 
residence or location, post office address and the sealed 
filing of the social security number; 
 2. The names and post office addresses of the 
respondent’s spouse, adult children, parents, and adult 
siblings or, if no such relatives are known to the 
petitioner, at least three other known relatives of the 
respondent, including step-children. If a total of three 
such persons cannot be identified and located, the 
petitioner shall certify that fact in the petition, and the 
court shall set forth such finding in the final order; 
 3.  The name, place of residence or location, and post 
office address of the individual or facility, if any, that is 
responsible for or has assumed responsibility for the 
respondent’s care or custody; 
 4.  The name, place of residence or location, and post 
office address of any agent designated under a durable 
power of attorney or an advance directive of which the 
respondent is the principal or any guardian, committee, 
or conservator currently acting, whether in this state or 
elsewhere, with a copy of any such documents, if 
available, attached by the petitioner; 
 5. The type of guardianship or conservatorship 
requested and a brief description of the nature and 
extent of the respondent’s alleged incapacity; 
 6.  When the petition requests appointment of a 
guardian, a brief description of the services currently 
being provided for the respondent’s health, care, safety, 
or rehabilitation and, where appropriate, a 
recommendation as to living arrangement and 
treatment plan; 
 7.  If the appointment of a limited guardian is 
requested, the specific areas of protection and 
assistance to be included in the order of appointment 
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and, if the appointment of a limited conservator is 
requested, the specific areas of management and 
assistance to be included in the order of appointment; 
 8.  The name and post office address of any proposed 
guardian or conservator or any guardian or conservator 
nominated by the respondent and that person’s 
relationship to the respondent; 
 9.  The native language of the respondent and any 
necessary alternative mode of communication; 
 10.  A statement of the financial resources of the 
respondent that shall, to the extent known, list the 
approximate value of the respondent’s property and 
the respondent’s anticipated annual gross income, 
other receipts, and debts; 
 11.  A statement of whether the petitioner believes 
that the respondent’s attendance at the hearing would 
be detrimental to the respondent’s health, care, or 
safety; and 
 12.  A request for appointment of a guardian ad litem. 
After a petition is filed the court is required to appoint a 
GAL “to represent the interests of the respondent.”  Section 37.2-
1003(B) further provides: 
Duties of the GAL include: (i) personally visiting the 
respondent; (ii) advising the respondent of rights 
pursuant to §§ 37.2-100631  and 37.2-100732, and 
certifying to the court that the respondent has been so 
advised; (iii) recommending that legal counsel should 
be appointed for the respondent, pursuant to § 37.2-
1006, if the guardian ad litem believes that counsel for 
the respondent is necessary; (iv) investigating the 
petition and evidence, requesting additional evaluation 
if necessary, and filing a report pursuant to subsection 
C; and (v) personally appearing at all court proceedings 
and conferences. 
Section 37.2-1003(C) mandates the contents of the GAL’s 
report (the “Report”).  The Report must address: 
(i) whether the court has jurisdiction; (ii) whether or not 
a guardian or conservator is needed; (iii) the extent of 
the duties and powers of the guardian or 
 
 31. Section 37.2-1006 provides that the Respondent has a right to counsel.  
 32. As noted, this part of the Statute provides that the Respondent is entitled to 
a jury trial, the right to participate at trial, to compel witnesses, and so forth.  
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conservator . . . ; (iv) the propriety and suitability of the 
person selected as guardian or conservator, after 
consideration of geographic location, familial or other 
relationship with the respondent, ability to carry out 
the powers and duties of the office, commitment to 
promoting the respondent’s welfare, any potential 
conflicts of interests, wishes of the respondent, and 
recommendations of relatives; (v) a recommendation as 
to the amount of surety on the conservator’s bond, if 
any33; and (vi) consideration of proper residential 
placement of the respondent. 
Given the GAL’s expansive duties and requirements of the 
Report, the Statute would seem to leave no area untouched by 
the GAL.  In fact, as seen below, that is the case; the GAL’s role 
is central if not crucial insofar as the court’s ultimate findings 
regarding capacity and who should be appointed as guardian.34 
The Statute does not require the Report to be served on any 
party (including the Respondent).  Moreover, there are no 
requirements concerning when the Report is to be filed, nor is 
the Report required to be submitted under oath.35 
In addition to the foregoing duties, a GAL opines on 
whether the Respondent needs personal legal representation.  
Under Section 37.2-1006, the Respondent has a right to counsel 
of her choice.  In some situations the GAL or court may conclude 
that counsel for the Respondent is unnecessary because one of 
the parties to the proceeding is protecting the Respondent’s 
interests. 
Section 37.2-1007, “Hearing on the petition to appoint,” 
provides in part that the Respondent is entitled to a jury trial 
 
 33.  Section 37.2-1019, “Taking of bond by clerk of court,” provides that 
whenever a fiduciary is appointed, the clerk of the court “shall have the authority to 
take the required bond, set the penalty thereof, and pass upon the sufficiency of the 
surety thereon.” 
 34. Simply stated, the GAL has a significant impact on the two primary issues 
in a guardianship proceeding, which are “whether a guardianship should be 
instituted, and if so, who should be appointed as guardian.” In re Guardianship of 
Miller, 299 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).  
 35. While this will be fully addressed below, it should be noted that these 
deficiencies significantly undermine the fairness of the proceedings, not only to the 
Respondent but to all parties in a capacity proceeding under the Statute.  
EDDLEMAN.PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2012  6:46 AM 
140 MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR [Vol. 13 
and may compel witnesses to attend.  The Respondent may also 
present evidence, confront, and cross-examine witnesses.36  
Either the court or a jury can hear the evidence surrounding the 
Petition.  The Respondent is entitled to be present at all stages of 
the proceedings.  If it is shown by clear and convincing evidence 
that the Respondent is incapacitated and in need of a guardian 
or conservator, the court shall appoint one or both, giving due 
deference to the Respondent’s wishes.37 
Section 37.2-1005 requires an Evaluation Report be provided 
by a physician or psychologist to the GAL (not the parties) 
within a reasonable time prior to the capacity hearing. The 
Statute mandates that the Respondent be evaluated by a licensed 
professional, skilled in the assessment and treatment of the 
Respondent’s alleged condition.38  If the Evaluation Report is not 
available at the hearing, the court may allow the hearing to go 
forward, unless the GAL objects.  The Evaluation Report 
requires certification by the medical professional concerning: 
1. A description of the nature, type, and extent of the 
respondent’s incapacity, including the respondent’s 
specific functional impairments; 
2. A diagnosis or assessment of the respondent’s mental 
and physical condition, including a statement as to 
whether the individual is on any medications that may 
affect his actions or demeanor, and, where appropriate 
and consistent with the scope of the evaluator’s license, 
an evaluation of the respondent’s ability to learn self-
care skills, adaptive behavior, and social skills and a 
prognosis for improvement; 
3. The date or dates of the examinations, evaluations, 
and assessments upon which the report is based; and 
4. The signature of the person conducting the 
evaluation and the nature of the professional license 
held by that person.39 
Section 37.2-1005(D) provides that the Evaluation Report is 
admissible as to the evidence of the facts stated therein and the 
 
 36. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1007. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. § 37.2-1005(B). 
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results of the examination, unless Respondent’s counsel or the 
GAL objects. 
The Statute is silent concerning the GAL’s role at the 
capacity hearing or trial.  As discussed below, the GAL often 
participates at the trial by presenting evidence, cross-examining 
witnesses, giving an opening and closing, and testifying.  The 
GAL appears to function as one of the parties’ attorneys in an 
adversarial capacity, although the GAL purportedly represents 
no party to the proceeding; moreover, the GAL also appears as if 
she were an expert when testifying and rendering an opinion 
concerning the ultimate issues in the case. 
Before examining the authority under which GALs are 
appointed, it is important to consider that although the Statute 
contains a number of safeguards for the Respondent’s 
protection, one of the greatest areas requiring closer scrutiny 
involves the Respondent’s assets.  Under Section 37.2-1012(F), 
the court may award compensation from the Respondent’s 
estate to any attorney, the GAL, and medical evaluators.  This 
provision is also a means of protecting the Respondent.  It 
provides a “fund” so to speak, and may act as an incentive to 
those without the financial resources to bring to the court’s 
attention those who are in need of assistance, i.e., elderly 
persons who may be incapacitated.  If the Respondent’s estate 
were not subject to being “taxed” for the costs of initiating and 
consummating the capacity proceeding, then some that are in 
need of court aid might not be brought to the court’s attention 
because family members may lack the means to finance the 
litigation. 
Courts typically award such compensation to the 
Petitioner’s attorney, the GAL, and medical evaluators 
whenever the estate can bear the cost as long as doing so does 
not jeopardize the Respondent’s future.  However, this provision 
is also subject to abuse, especially when the Respondent’s estate 
is substantial.  In those instances where a family member is 
motivated by financial gains or other ulterior reasons, the 
provision allowing for compensation becomes a “war chest” or a 
EDDLEMAN.PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2012  6:46 AM 
142 MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR [Vol. 13 
means otherwise not available for financing spurious claims, 
specifically, false allegations concerning the Respondent’s 
condition.  For example, the Respondent may be elderly, 
wealthy, and physically weak but by no means incapacitated as 
defined by the Statute.  Those who are ill-motivated can be 
emboldened to file a Petition upon learning that the 
Respondent’s resources can be the source of financing his own 
demise.  The statutory compensation provision might encourage 
spurious litigation.  The courts do not adequately police such 
practices, especially when the parties reach a settlement prior to 
a hearing on capacity.40 
III.  AUTHORITY TO APPOINT A GAL 
There are three possible sources of authority concerning a 
GAL’s appointment in the context of a capacity hearing.  The 
first is the Statute.  As seen, the Statute requires a GAL to be 
appointed after the Petition is filed and, in addition, specifies the 
GAL’s duties.  The second source of authority derives from a 
trial court’s inherent authority under the parens patriae doctrine.  
Historically the courts have had the power to appoint a 
guardian for any incompetent person coming within its 
jurisdiction.  Finally, the third potential source of authority for 
appointing a GAL derives from Virginia Code Section 8.01-9.41 
 
 40. Although there are no available studies, it is common to see extraordinary 
sums paid from the Respondent’s estate, especially fees paid to the attorneys.  In 
many instances the Respondent’s estate is substantially depleted by such payments.  
The courts are eager to accept the parties’ settlements and if no one complains or 
brings the matter of attorney’s fees to the court, it will go unnoticed and will be 
paid from the Respondent’s funds/assets.  The Hayes court noted with some irony, if 
not sarcasm, that the petitioners’ complaint that attorney’s fees could exceed 
$150,000.00 (which was more than the ward’s entire estate) was “like the 
apocryphal story of the man who kills both his parents and begs the court for mercy 
because he is an orphan.”  952 So. 2d 498, 509 (Fla. 2006). 
 41. Section 8.01-9, “Guardian ad litem for persons under disability; when 
guardian ad litem need not be appointed for person under disability,” provides in 
full:  
  A.  A suit wherein a person under a disability is a party defendant shall 
not be stayed because of such disability, but the court in which the suit is 
pending, or the clerk thereof, shall appoint a discreet and competent 
attorney-at-law as guardian ad litem to such defendant, whether the 
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defendant has been served with process or not. If no such attorney is 
found willing to act, the court shall appoint some other discreet and 
proper person as guardian ad litem. Any guardian ad litem so appointed 
shall not be liable for costs. Every guardian ad litem shall faithfully 
represent the estate or other interest of the person under a disability for 
whom he is appointed, and it shall be the duty of the court to see that the 
interest of the defendant is so represented and protected. Whenever the 
court is of the opinion that the interest of the defendant so requires, it shall 
remove any guardian ad litem and appoint another in his stead. When, in 
any case, the court is satisfied that the guardian ad litem has rendered 
substantial service in representing the interest of the person under a 
disability, it may allow the guardian reasonable compensation therefor, 
and his actual expenses, if any, to be paid out of the estate of the 
defendant. However, if the defendant's estate is inadequate for the 
purpose of paying compensation and expenses, all, or any part thereof, 
may be taxed as costs in the proceeding or, in the case of proceedings to 
adjudicate a person under a disability as an habitual offender pursuant to 
former § 46.2-351.2 or former § 46.2-352, shall be paid by the 
Commonwealth out of the state treasury from the appropriation for 
criminal charges. In a civil action against an incarcerated felon for 
damages arising out of a criminal act, the compensation and expenses of 
the guardian ad litem shall be paid by the Commonwealth out of the state 
treasury from the appropriation for criminal charges. If judgment is 
against the incarcerated felon, the amount allowed by the court to the 
guardian ad litem shall be taxed against the incarcerated felon as part of 
the costs of the proceeding, and if collected, the same shall be paid to the 
Commonwealth. By order of the court, in a civil action for divorce from an 
incarcerated felon, the compensation and expenses of the guardian ad 
litem shall be paid by the Commonwealth out of the state treasury from 
the appropriation for criminal charges if the crime (i) for which the felon is 
incarcerated occurred after the date of the marriage for which the divorce 
is sought, (ii) for which the felon is incarcerated was committed against the 
felon's spouse, child, or stepchild and involved physical injury, sexual 
assault, or sexual abuse, and (iii) resulted in incarceration subsequent to 
conviction and the felon was sentenced to confinement for more than one 
year. The amount allowed by the court to the guardian ad litem shall be 
taxed against the incarcerated felon as part of the costs of the proceeding, 
and if collected, the same shall be paid to the Commonwealth. 
  B.  Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection A or the provisions of 
any other law to the contrary, in any suit wherein a person under a 
disability is a party and is represented by an attorney-at-law duly licensed 
to practice in this Commonwealth, who shall have entered of record an 
appearance for such person, no guardian ad litem need be appointed for 
such person unless the court determines that the interests of justice require 
such appointment; or unless a statute applicable to such suit expressly 
requires that the person under a disability be represented by a guardian ad 
litem. The court may, in its discretion, appoint the attorney of record for 
the person under a disability as his guardian ad litem, in which event the 
attorney shall perform all the duties and functions of guardian ad litem. 
Any judgment or decree rendered by any court against a person under a 
disability without a guardian ad litem, but in compliance with the 
provisions of this subsection B, shall be as valid as if the guardian ad litem 
had been appointed. 
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Virginia courts have read Section 8.01-9 in conjunction with 
other statutes requiring or authorizing a GAL’s appointment, 
and there is every reason to conclude that they will read Section 
8.01-9 in conjunction with the Statute.  However, as discussed 
below, Section 8.01-9 should have no applicability to a GAL 
appointed in the elder law context. 
Reading Section 8.01-9 in conjunction with the Statute 
results in an expansion of the GAL’s duties.42  Stated differently, 
a GAL acting under Section 8.01-9 may engage in conduct 
during the proceedings that exceeds the express and/or implied 
duties authorized under the Statute. 
On the other hand, the Statute is extremely broad in what it 
empowers a GAL to do.  It requires the GAL to investigate and 
submit a report concerning all the evidence relating to the 
Petition.  So the question is, how could Section 8.01-9 possibly 
expand the scope of a GAL’s duties given the fact that her duties 
under the Statute are so expansive?  The answer to this question 
is not simple.  At present, it suffices to say that reading Section 
8.01-9 and the Statute together may result in an expanded role 
for the GAL because as currently interpreted by the courts, 
Section 8.01-9 imposes an obligation on the GAL to assume 
attorney-client responsibilities.  In other words, if Section 8.01-9 
is read in connection with the Statute, the GAL may be required 
to assume litigation-type responsibilities.  This is more than a 
little confusing because a GAL appointed pursuant to the Statute 
is not appointed to act as a lawyer for the Respondent 
individually. 
Given the considerable confusion concerning a GAL’s role 
under Section 8.01-9, not to mention the general befuddlement 
surrounding a GAL’s role in any context, it would be useful to 
 
 42. This article attempts to identify and clarify the GAL’s role.  As seen below, 
the GAL’s role is beclouded despite the courts’ valiant attempts.  For example, the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals attempted to distinguish a GAL’s role from that of the 
“adversarial” attorney in Jennifer M. v. Maurer, stating that “[a]n appointed 
guardian ad litem is an advocate for the best interests of the ward. . . . A ward's 
adversary counsel shall be an advocate for the expressed wishes of the ward.”  779 
N.W.2d 436, 439 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotations omitted; emphasis in 
original). 
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adumbrate the sequence of the analysis that follows.  Because 
the courts have not been consistent regarding the GAL’s role 
especially as it pertains to Section 8.01-9, we will look first at 
Section 8.01-9’s language, followed by the scant but important 
case law under Section 8.01-9.  Secondly, we address the court’s 
powers under the parens patriae doctrine. 
Section 8.01-9 appears to be Virginia’s codification of two 
English statutes dating from the thirteenth Century.  In general, 
Section 8.01-9 permits legal actions to continue against or on 
behalf of a party who is under a disability.43  Rather than 
dismissing a suit brought against or on behalf of an incompetent 
person, the court appoints a GAL to monitor the interests of the 
person under a disability.  Section 8.01-9 is jurisdictional; if the 
proceedings continue in the GAL’s absence, any judgment is 
void and subject to collateral attack.44 
A straight-forward reading of Section 8.01-9 would render it 
inapplicable in the elder law context because it applies only 
when the “party”45 or person named in the legal action is under 
a disability or incapacitated at the time the suit is initiated.46  In 
proceedings under the Statute, however, the Respondent has not 
yet been adjudicated as incapacitated; the determination of the 
putative ward’s capacity is one of the primary purposes of the 
proceedings. 
The language of Section 8.01-9(A) clearly shows this to be 
 
 43. Virginia Code Section 8.01-2(6) defines “Person under a disability” as:  
(a) a person convicted of a felony . . . ; (b) an infant; (c) an incapacitated 
person as defined in § 37.2-1000; (d) an incapacitated ex-service person 
under § 37.2-1016; or (e) any other person who, upon motion to the court 
by any party to an action or suit or by any person in interest, is determined 
to be (i) incapable of taking proper care of his person, or (ii) incapable of 
properly handling and managing his estate, or (iii) otherwise unable to 
defend his property or legal rights either because of age or temporary or 
permanent impairment, whether physical, mental, or both. Such 
impairment may also include substance abuse as defined in § 37.2-100. 
 44. See the dissent and cases cited therein in Graham v. Commonwealth, 443 
S.E.2d 586 (Va. Ct. App. 1994). 
 45. The Statute defines the putative ward (or the Respondent) as a party.  § 
37.2-1000.  However, as noted, the Respondent is not yet deemed to be under a 
disability or incapacitated.    
 46. See § 8.01-2(6), supra note 43. 
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the case: 
A suit wherein a person under a disability is a party 
defendant shall not be stayed because of such 
disability, but the court in which the suit is pending, or 
the clerk thereof, shall appoint a discreet and 
competent attorney-at-law as guardian ad litem to such 
defendant . . . . Every guardian ad litem shall faithfully 
represent the estate or other interest of the person 
under a disability for whom he is appointed . . . .47 
The inapplicability of Section 8.01-9 to proceedings under 
the Statute is evident from the first clause.  While the 
Respondent, under the Statute is in fact a “party,” the 
Respondent has not yet been adjudged to be a person under a 
“disability.”48 
The second clause supports the proposition that Section 
8.01-9 does not empower a GAL to assume litigation or 
advocacy functions on the Respondent/ward’s behalf.  It 
provides that the GAL shall faithfully represent the “estate or 
other interest” of the person under disability.  Section 8.01-9 is 
not, on its face, a mechanism for appointing a lawyer with 
litigation responsibilities in a typical attorney-client context; the 
attorney/GAL under Section 8.01-9(A) functions as a GAL and 
faithfully represents not a “client,” but the “estate or other 
interest” of the person under disability.  She functions in a 
“GAL” capacity (however that term is understood), but not as 
 
 47. Section 8.01-9(B) provides in part that notwithstanding subsection A or 
other provisions of the law to the contrary, in any suit where the person under a 
disability is represented by an attorney who has entered his appearance, no GAL 
need be appointed unless the court determines that the interest of justice requires 
such an appointment.  The court may appoint the attorney of record for the person 
under disability to “perform all the duties and functions of guardian ad litem.”  § 
8.01-9(B).  In other words, the attorney of record may continue in her role as an 
advocate attorney (with the traditional obligations under the attorney-client 
relationship) as well as be appointed as a GAL.  
 48. In Bailey v. Phelps, 66 Va. Cir. 413, 414 (1997), a GAL was appointed for a 
prisoner due to his status as a convicted felon, which thus qualified him as being 
“under a disability.”  § 8.01-2(6)(a).  After reviewing the various committee statutes, 
the circuit court determined that Section 8.01-9 is applicable at any time a person is 
under a disability.  This decision is authority for the proposition that § 8.01-9 
applies only when a person is already deemed to be under a disability.  
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the ward’s attorney per se.49 
Although the language of Section 8.01-9 on its face would 
preclude its applicability in the elder law context, Virginia courts 
have read Section 8.01-9 in conjunction with other statutes 
involving GAL appointments in situations where the person 
under disability was not a party.  Specifically, courts read 
Section 8.01-9 in connection with GALs appointed under Title 
16, and have done so when the person was not a “party” to the 
suit.50  Again, as can be seen from the language of Section 8.01-9, 
the statute should not be applied in that situation either. 
We next address three Virginia cases involving the GAL’s 
role under Section 8.01-9.  All three evidence the confusion 
concerning the GAL’s role.  In addition, they illustrate both the 
inapplicability of Section 8.01-9 if that statute were correctly 
interpreted, as well as the likelihood that courts in the future 
will apply Section 8.01-9 to GALs in the elder law context. 
In Stanley v. Fairfax County Department of Social Services,51 a 
mother’s rights to her children had been terminated.52  The 
statute authorizing the petition for termination53 was silent as to 
who could actually file it.  In this instance, the GAL had done so.  
Before the petition could be filed, the Department of Social 
Services (“Department”) was required to file a foster care plan54 
 
 49. As noted, § 8.01-9(B) allows the attorney to be appointed as GAL.  That 
applies when the attorney of record for the incapacitated party is later appointed as 
GAL to represent his own client. 
 50. The pertinent provisions under Title 16 involve the appointment of GALs 
where the “ward” is a child.  § 16.1-266.  As we will see from the discussion below, 
while the child is “under a disability” by virtue of being a minor, the child is not a 
party to the suit; therefore, § 8.01-9 is inapplicable.  For example, in a divorce action 
with custody disputes, the children may be appointed a GAL under Title 16.  
However, the children are not parties to the suit—their parents are.  Nevertheless, 
the courts have justified the appointment and conduct of GALs in such 
circumstances, ruling that § 8.01-9 supported the GAL’s actions and/or that § 8.01-9 
authorized the GAL’s appointment. 
 51. 405 S.E.2d 621 (Va. 1991). 
 52. Id. at 622.  Virginia Code Sections 16.1-283(A) and (B) allow a Juvenile and 
Domestic Relations court (J&DR) to terminate the residual parental rights (TPR) of 
parents when there has been a previous judicial determination that the parents have 
abused or neglected their children.   
 53. § 16.1-283. 
 54. § 16.1-281. 
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documenting the fact that termination was in the children’s best 
interests.  Because the Department was required to file the foster 
care plan, the mother claimed that only the Department was 
authorized to file the petition.  The mother/ appellant argued 
that the GAL exceeded her authority by filing the petition.  She 
claimed that a GAL acts in an advisory capacity only.55 
In affirming the GAL’s action in filing the petition, the court 
relied, in part, on Section 8.01-9, reading it with the provisions 
under Title 16.56 Although the termination statute was silent 
concerning who could file, Section 16.1-241(A) allowed the court 
to consider petitions filed by any “party with a legitimate 
interest therein.”57  A GAL, said the court, certainly had an 
interest in whether the ward was subject to abuse and neglect.  
In addition, the court explained that Section 16.1-266(A) 
required the Juvenile and Domestic Relations court (J&DR) to 
appoint a “discreet and competent attorney-at-law” as GAL.  
Finally, Section 8.01-9 required that “‘every [GAL] shall 
faithfully represent the . . . interest of the person under disability 
for whom he is appointed.’”58  Apparently, part of faithfully 
representing the children under Section 8.01-9 included filing a 
petition. 
As noted, before Section 8.01-9 could apply the children 
would have to be parties.59  However, the court never addressed 
this issue.60  It merely assumed Section 8.01-9’s applicability, 
 
 55. 405 S.E.2d at 622. 
 56. Id. at 623.  Section 16.1-266, “Appointment of counsel and guardian ad 
litem,” provides in subsection A that:  
Prior to the hearing by the court of any case involving a child who is 
alleged to be abused or neglected or who is the subject of an entrustment 
agreement or a petition seeking termination of residual parental rights or 
who is otherwise before the court pursuant to subdivision A 4 of § 16.1-241 
or § 63.2-1230, the court shall appoint a discreet and competent attorney-
at-law as guardian ad litem to represent the child pursuant to § 16.1-266.1. 
 57. Stanley, 405 S.E.2d at 623. 
 58. Id. (quoting § 8.01-9). 
 59. § 8.01-9 (“A suit wherein a person under disability is a party . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 60. Chief Justice Carrico would have reversed. Stanley, 405 S.E.2d at 623.  His 
dissent is not only interesting but illuminating.  Relying on the traditional definition 
of a GAL, he argued that the GAL had no authority to file the petition.  Id. at 623–
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assuming further that Section 8.01-9 applies to literally “every” 
GAL appointed.61 
Two years later the Court of Appeals of Virginia, in a matter 
of first impression, addressed whether Section 8.01-9 applied 
where a ward was not a “party.”62  In Verrocchio v. Verrocchio, a 
divorce action involving a custody dispute, the appellant/ 
husband argued that the circuit court had no specific statutory 
authority to continue a GAL’s appointment.63  Initially the GAL 
had been appointed under Title 16 by the J&DR court.64  The 
appellant argued that although the J&DR court had specific 
statutory power for the GAL’s initial appointment, the circuit 
court could not appoint a GAL under Section 8.01-9, because the 
child was not a “party.”  
 
24.  Accordingly, once the J&DR court had made a finding that the mother had 
abused the children that action was resolved.  Because the case had ended, the 
GAL’s role had ended.  So when the GAL filed the petition, she lacked any 
authority to do so.  Id. at 623.  Chief Justice Carrico quoted Black’s Law Dictionary, 
(6th ed. 1990), defining a GAL as “‘a special guardian appointed by the court in 
which a particular litigation is pending to represent an infant, ward or unborn 
person in that particular litigation, and the status of guardian ad litem exists only in 
that specific litigation in which the appointment occurs.’” Id. (emphasis by C.J. Carrico).   
Chief Justice Carrico’s analysis is important because, as addressed below, the scope 
of a GAL’s duties in Virginia is to some extent defined in light of the common law 
definition of a GAL.  Consequently, when a statute uses the term “guardian ad 
litem,” that term carries a specific historical and legal meaning.  Therefore, a GAL’s 
duties will be defined to some extent by the common law in addition to the 
particular statute under which she is appointed.  
 61. Generally speaking, this decision is authority for the proposition that in 
addition to a GAL’s advisory and investigatory role, the GAL has the authority, if 
not the obligation in some circumstances, to file pleadings on the ward’s behalf.  
Filing pleadings is part of the obligations an attorney assumes in a typical attorney-
client relationship.  The decision is also authority for the proposition that a lawyer 
who is a GAL appointed under other statutes also assumes obligations under 
Section 8.01-9, which may require the GAL to file pleadings or to take on an 
adversarial role.  However, historically under Section 8.01-9, the attorney appointed 
as GAL is not an advocate in the traditional sense and is not required to assume the 
role of filing pleadings as an adversary.  Under the Statute, the GAL is not the 
lawyer for the putative ward in the strict sense of the word.  The Statute itself 
provides that the GAL shall investigate whether the ward is in need of separate 
counsel, and if so, the GAL is to notify the court of the same.  However, as noted, if 
Section 8.01-9 is read in conjunction with the Statute, it may require the GAL to 
assume that adversarial role herself.      
 62.  Verrocchio v. Verrocchio, 429 S.E.2d 482, 484 (Va. Ct. App. 1993). 
 63.  429 S.E.2d at 483. 
 64.  Id.  
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The case was appealed to the circuit court, and after 
disposing of the case at that level, the circuit court reconfirmed 
the GAL’s appointment, sending the matter back to J&DR.  The 
Court of Appeals conceded that the child was “technically not a 
party” but, nevertheless, the child was the “subject” of the 
proceeding.65  Therefore, the child was “in a very real sense the 
ward of the court,” and courts have historically been 
empowered under the doctrine of parens patriae to appoint 
GALs.66  In addition, the Court of Appeals observed that Section 
8.01-9 did not expressly prohibit a circuit court from appointing 
a GAL, nor did it encompass the entire subject of the court’s 
discretionary protective powers.67 
The Verrocchio Court correctly ruled that the child was not a 
party, and therefore Section 8.01-9 was inapplicable.68  However, 
Verrocchio is not the last word on this issue because its decision 
arises only from an intermediate court. 
In Bottoms v. Bottoms,69 Virginia’s Supreme Court seemingly 
ignored the earlier Verrocchio holding and its rationale that 
Section 8.01-9 was not controlling when the child/ward was not 
a party.70  In Bottoms, the issue involved a custody dispute 
between the appellant/mother and the maternal grandmother, 
the appellee.  The grandmother sought custody of the child in 
the J&DR court.  No GAL was appointed then.  When the 
grandmother was awarded custody, the mother appealed to the 
circuit court, which appointed a GAL under Section 8.01-9.71  
The circuit court upheld the J&DR’s decision in awarding 
custody to the grandmother.  The mother appealed again and 
the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court.  This time the 
grandmother appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed 
 
 65.  Id. at 489. 
 66.  Id.  The parens patriae doctrine is addressed below.  
 67.  Id. at 485. 
 68. See id. at 485, 486. 
 69. 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995). 
 70. This is not to imply that the Supreme Court is bound by the lower court’s 
opinion.   
 71. Id. at 104, 108. 
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the Court of Appeals.72 
In doing so, the Virginia Supreme Court observed that the 
circuit court had a right to rely on the GAL’s opinion; it 
supported its decision by relying, in part, on Section 8.01-9.  The 
court stated: 
The duty of a guardian ad litem in a child custody 
dispute is to see that the interest of the child is 
“represented and protected.”  Code § 8.01-9.  See Rule 
8:673 (describing role of guardian ad litem appointed for 
child in juvenile and domestic relations district courts.) 
This child had no other independent participant in the 
proceeding, aside from the trial court, to protect his 
interests.74 
The Supreme Court assumed the applicability of Section 
8.01-9 without any analysis.  In addition, the court referred to 
Rule 8:6, describing a GAL’s role.  However, Rule 8:6, applies 
only to J&DR courts and although the Supreme Court 
recognized this, it apparently failed to consider the fact that the 
GAL in that case had not been appointed by the J&DR court but 
by the circuit court.  The court relied on the fact that the child 
had no one to protect his interests, other than the trial court.  In 
addition, the Supreme Court never addressed the fact that the 
circuit court could have appointed the GAL under the parens 
patriae doctrine as was noted in Verrocchio. 
The foregoing decisions highlight not only the confusion 
concerning the scope of a GAL’s duties, but also the 
questionable applicability of Section 8.01-9.  Apparently, the 
Virginia Supreme Court assumes that Section 8.01-9 applies any 
time a GAL is appointed.  Universal application of Section 8.01-9 
 
 72. Id. at 107. 
 73. VA. SUP. CT. R. 8:6:  
The Roles of Counsel and of Guardians Ad Litem When Representing Children.  
The role of counsel for a child is representation of the child’s legitimate 
interests.  When appointed for a child, the guardian ad litem shall 
vigorously represent the child, fully protecting the child’s interest and 
welfare.  The guardian ad litem shall advise the court of the wishes of the 
child in any case where the wishes of the child conflict with the opinion of 
the guardian ad litem as to what is in the child’s interest and welfare. 
 74.  457 S.E.2d at 108. 
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carries with it the requirement that a GAL in every instance 
“faithfully represent the estate or interest” of the person under 
disability.  In Stanley that meant the GAL was authorized to file 
a petition for termination of parental rights.  In Bottoms, the 
Supreme Court held that the circuit court was allowed to 
consider the GAL’s opinion under Section 8.01-9 even though 
the statute did not apply.  In both cases, the GAL acted as an 
attorney-advocate, filing a pleading in one instance (Stanley) and 
making a closing statement the other (Bottoms75). 
These decisions raise the following question: is there any 
distinction between a GAL’s obligations and those of an attorney 
in a typical attorney-client relationship in a litigation context?  In 
other words, assuming the courts will read Section 8.01-9 in 
conjunction with the GAL’s duties under the Statute, does the 
GAL assume litigation responsibilities running to the 
Respondent such as filing pleadings and so forth?  As noted, 
under the Statute the GAL is not appointed as the Respondent’s 
attorney; rather the GAL is to notify the court if the GAL 
surmises that counsel is needed for the Respondent.  However, 
as we shall see in Part IV, GALs typically do function as  
attorney-advocates.  Therefore, perhaps the question should be 
rephrased: Is there any authority allowing a GAL to function 
essentially as litigation counsel? 
Before reviewing the parens patriae doctrine, it would be 
useful to consider a Maryland decision analyzing a rule of court 
that is substantially similar to Virginia’s Section 8.01-9.  The 
decision in Fox v. Wills,76 (“Wills”) further calls into question 
whether Section 8.01-9 should be read in conjunction with other 
statutes and undermines Virginia decisions holding that Section 
8.01-9 empowers a GAL to assume litigation or advocacy-type 
functions. 
In Wills, the Maryland Court of Appeals, Maryland’s 
highest court, reversed a finding that an attorney, ostensibly a 
 
 75.  457 S.E.2d at 106. 
 76.  890 A.2d 726 (Md. 2006). 
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“guardian ad litem,”77 was immune from a malpractice suit.78  In 
the underlying divorce suit with custody issues, a lawyer/GAL 
was appointed counsel for the parties’ child under Section 1-202 
of Maryland’s Family Law article.79  Section 1-202 provided:  
In an action in which custody, visitation rights, or the 
amount of support of a minor child is contested, the 
court may: [ ] appoint to represent the minor child 
counsel who may not represent any party to the action.80 
After the divorce case ended the mother filed a malpractice 
action on the child’s behalf against the GAL/lawyer, claiming 
that the GAL/lawyer had failed to monitor the father who was 
alleged to have engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior with 
the child.81  The mother also alleged, among other things, that 
the attorney had distorted a psychological evaluation concerning 
the child because of the lawyer’s friendship with the father.82  
Both the trial court and Maryland’s Special Court of Appeals 
determined that the attorney was not acting solely as counsel for 
the minor; rather, he was acting as a GAL.  Therefore, his 
primary allegiance ran to the court as an arm of the court, not 
the child, and because the lawyer/defendant had taken on 
judicial functions, the two lower courts held that he was cloaked 
with immunity and could not be sued.83 
Maryland’s highest court reversed, holding that there was 
no support for the lower courts’ conclusion that an attorney 
appointed under Section 1-202 should be granted immunity.84  
 
 77.  Guardian ad litem is in quotation marks, because the Court of Appeals 
ultimately held that the attorney did not act in that capacity.  Id. at 733.   
 78.  The intermediate court of appeals and the trial court had ruled that the 
attorney was immune from a malpractice action because he acted as a GAL, i.e., as 
an arm or agent of the court with judicial functions.  Id. at 728–29.  The appellant/ 
lawyer claimed he was performing judicial functions, and the common law doctrine 
of absolute or qualified immunity foreclosed the malpractice suit against him.  Id.   
 79.  Id. at 726. 
 80.  Id. at n.1 (quoting MD. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 1-202 (2004) (emphasis 
added)). “Counsel” is emphasized because nowhere in the statute is the phrase 
“guardian ad litem” used.   
 81.  890 A.2d at 727. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. at 728. 
 84.  Id. at 729. 
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There was nothing in the wording or history of Section 1-202 
indicating that the lawyer functioned as an arm of the court, and 
there were no legislative enactments granting immunity.  
Moreover, under Section 1-202, the attorney was not a GAL as 
that term was used in other states.85  Consequently, the 
purported “GAL” was not shielded by absolute or qualified 
immunity.86 
The Court of Appeals noted the nationwide confusion 
surrounding a GAL’s role in contrast with Maryland where the 
term guardian ad litem was rarely used.87  When that term was 
used, it involved the concept of prochein ami, or next friend, as 
set forth in Maryland Rule 2-202,88 a rule similar in operation 
 
 85.  Id. at 732. 
 86.  Id. at 737.  To solidify the point, the same statute currently reads that the 
court may “appoint a lawyer who shall serve as a child advocate attorney to represent 
the minor child.”  § 1-202 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 87.  890 A.2d at 729.  In fact, the Wills court noted that the faulty reasoning of 
the two lower courts was premised on the role of a GAL as the term GAL had come 
to mean in other states.  Id. 
 88.  MD. CODE ANN. § 2-202.  Rule 2-202 and Virginia § 8.01-9 derive from two 
English statutes dating to the thirteenth Century.  Wills, 890 A.2d at 730–31.  Both 
provide that a suit shall not abate against an incompetent.  Instead a guardian will 
be appointed to represent the interests of the incapacitated party/ward.  Virginia’s 
statute uses the term guardian ad litem while Maryland uses “guardian.” Maryland 
Rule 2-202 (2012) states: 
Rule 2-202. Capacity  
  (a) Generally. Applicable substantive law governs the capacity to sue 
or be sued of an individual, a corporation, a person acting in a 
representative capacity, an association, or any other entity. 
  (b) Suits by individuals under disability. An individual under 
disability to sue may sue by a guardian or other like fiduciary or, if none, 
by next friend, subject to any order of court for the protection of the 
individual under disability. When a minor is in the sole custody of one of 
its parents, that parent has the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the minor 
for a period of one year following the accrual of the cause of action, and if 
the custodial parent fails to institute suit within the one year period, any 
person interested in the minor shall have the right to institute suit on 
behalf of the minor as next friend upon first mailing notice to the last 
known address of the custodial parent. 
  (c) Settlement of suits on behalf of minors. A next friend who files an 
action for the benefit of a minor may settle the claim in accordance with 
this subsection. If the next friend is not a parent or person in loco parentis 
of the child, the settlement is not effective unless approved by each living 
parent or person in loco parentis. If (1) both parents are dead and there is 
no person in loco parentis of the child or (2) one of the parents does not 
approve the settlement, the settlement is not effective unless approved by 
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and purpose to Virginia’s Section 8.01-9.  Rule 2-202’s concept of 
prochein ami undermined the claim that the attorney/defendant 
appointed to represent a minor performs judicial functions or 
owes her primary duty to the court.  Instead, as prochein ami the 
attorney’s primary allegiance runs to the ward.89 
Virginia’s Section 8.01-9 is substantially the same as 
Maryland’s Rule 2-202.  Both embody the concept of prochein 
ami.  Under English statutes going back hundreds of years, a 
person appointed to represent the estate or interests of a minor 
was not necessarily an attorney.  In fact, the prochein ami was 
most often not a lawyer90 but someone (a family member or 
friend of the family) familiar with the minor/ward who came 
forward and asked to be appointed by the court to assist the 
child/ward.  Because the next friend was not an attorney, he was 
obviously not in a position to assume litigation responsibilities.91 
 
the court in which the suit is pending. Approval may be granted only on 
verified application by the next friend, stating the facts of the case and 
why the settlement is in the best interest of the child. . . .  
  (d) Suits against individuals under disability. In a suit against an 
individual under disability, the guardian or other like fiduciary, if any, 
shall defend the action. The court shall order any guardian or other 
fiduciary in its jurisdiction who fails to comply with this section to defend 
the individual as required. If there is no such guardian or other fiduciary, 
the court shall appoint an attorney to represent and defend the individual. 
 89.  Wills, 890 A.2d at 731. 
 90.  See e.g., Hinton v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 120 S.E. 135 (Va. 1923) (ward 
brought suit by prochein ami but had separate advocate counsel); Kirby v. Gilliam, 
28 S.E.2d 40, 43 (Va. 1943) (noting that the practice in Virginia was for the father or 
near relative to act in the capacity of next friend without a formal appointment for 
the purpose of bringing suit on behalf of a minor).   
  It should also be noted, that under Virginia Code Section 8.01-9, a lawyer 
should be appointed as GAL, but when one is not available, someone else must be 
appointed: “[T]he court . . . shall appoint a discreet and competent attorney-at-law 
as guardian ad litem . . . . If no such attorney is found willing to act, the court shall 
appoint some other discreet and proper person as guardian ad litem.”  This, too, is 
further evidence that under Section 8.01-9, a lawyer would not be appointed in the 
capacity of an advocate with the same duties as a lawyer in a traditional attorney-
client relationship.      
 91.  Originally under English common law, only a person standing in loco 
parentis could institute suit on a ward’s behalf.  In practice, however, those standing 
in loco parentis would often, according to Fox v. Wills, hide the ward;  if the ward 
was not before the court, any proposed court-appointed guardian that would have 
been empowered to bring a suit on the ward’s behalf could not do so.   890 A.2d  at 
731.  In 1275, Parliament enacted the first statute of Westminster, allowing anyone 
to bring suit, not just the person standing in loco parentis.  Id.  However, this statute 
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If the statutory analysis in Wills is correct, then Section 8.01-
9 does not empower a GAL to function as an advocate in the 
sense of filing pleadings or acting as litigation counsel for the 
ward.  The mixing of advocacy functions with judicial 
obligations is simply not embodied in Section 8.01-9.  So when 
the Supreme Court in Stanley determined that Section 8.01-9 
authorized a GAL to file pleadings, it did not take into 
consideration Section 8.01-9’s history.  Specifically, the court did 
not recognize the prochein ami concepts engrafted into Section 
8.01-9, which have nothing to do with lawyers appointed in a 
specific suit to act as an advocate. 
Given the history presented in Wills, we return to the 
Verrocchio court’s holding that in the absence of a specific court 
rule or statute, courts have the inherent equitable power to 
appoint a GAL.92  That power is distinct from the statutory 
authority a court may exercise in a divorce proceeding.93  
Because a ward is before the court and because Virginia courts 
have succeeded to the powers of the English chancery courts, the 
common law doctrine of parens patriae is triggered.94 
Parens patriae is the “power of the Commonwealth to watch 
over the interests of those who are incapable of protecting 
themselves.”95  The court in Verrocchio explained why that power 
was necessary, observing that parents cannot always be trusted 
 
was limited to circumstances where the guardian of the person was interfering with 
the ward’s attempt to bring suit.  Id.  Therefore, in 1285, the second statute of 
Westminster allowed the next friend to sue on the ward’s behalf in any 
circumstances, not merely those where the guardian was attempting to secrete the 
ward.   Id.  According to Wills, these concepts were adopted when Maryland 
became a state, and engrafted into Maryland Rule 2-202, id., which again is identical 
in purposes to Virginia Code Section 8.01-9. 
 92. The decision in Verrocchio further noted that Virginia Supreme Court Rule 
2:19 authorized courts in the absence of a specific rule to rely on “established 
practices” of the courts.  429 S.E.2d at n.2 (“The propriety of relying on established 
practices is recognized by Rule 2:19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, 
which provides: ‘In matters not covered by these Rules the established practice and 
procedure in equity is continued.’”)  In addition, Verrocchio noted that in the context 
of child welfare matters, the “established practice” was to appoint a GAL to watch 
out for the best interests of the child.  Id. at 484. 
 93. Id. at 485. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. (citation omitted). 
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to watch over a child’s interests.96 
In Ferguson v. Grubb,97 the court likewise invoked parens 
patriae, noting that statutes and court rules are not the exclusive 
sources of power concerning a GAL’s appointment.  The 
appellant/father argued that the circuit court had no authority to 
continue or reconfirm a GAL’s appointment.98  The matter was 
before the circuit court because the father had appealed a J&DR 
ruling.  In disposing of the appeal, the circuit court reconfirmed 
the previous J&DR court order, which included a GAL’s 
appointment.  The appellant asserted that the circuit court had 
no authority to continue the GAL’s appointment because no 
legal proceedings remained before the circuit court when it 
transferred the case back to J&DR.99  The case being ended, so 
did the GAL’s authority.  Not so, said the Court of Appeals100; 
Virginia courts have equitable power “dating back to chancery 
days.”101 
* * * 
Thus far we have provided a review of a GAL’s role when 
appointed pursuant to Section 8.01-9, Title 16, and under the 
parens patriae doctrine.  We have reviewed the derivation of 
Section 8.01-9 and have seen that a GAL is empowered, if not 
 
 96. Id.  The decision in Virginia v. G.R.N., 22 Va. Cir. 134 (1990), is an example of 
a situation where a mother acting as GAL failed to protect her child.  The circuit 
court voided felony convictions of a minor in J&DR court because the mother on 
behalf of the child waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Id. at 135.  Under 
Virginia Code Section 16.1-266, a child can agree to waive this right with parental 
consent, so long as the parent’s interests are not adverse to the child’s.  Id.  After 
waiving his right to counsel, the minor pled guilty.  Judge Annunziata ruled that 
the waiver was invalid because the mother had a conflict of interest: the minor was 
charged with sodomizing his younger siblings.  The mother, said the circuit court, 
could not consent to the waiver because of conflicting interests between her 
children who had allegedly been sodomized and her son who was allegedly guilty.  
Id.   
 97. 574 S.E.2d 769 (Va. Ct. App. 2003). 
 98. Id. at 772. 
 99.  The appellant was essentially arguing what Justice Carrico argued in the 
Stanley dissent.  Under the definition of a GAL, a GAL’s duties encompass the 
specific proceeding before the court and when the case has ended, the GAL’s duties 
end.   
 100.  574 S.E.2d at 772. 
 101.  Verrocchio, 429 S.E.2d at 485 (citation omitted). 
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required, to assume an advocacy role on behalf of her ward in 
some situations. 
Even that, however, cannot be said with certainty given the 
Court of Appeals’ holding in Ruffin v. Commonwealth,102 which 
involved a GAL’s appointment solely under Section 8.01-9.  
Because the GAL was appointed under Section 8.01-9 only, one 
might expect more clarity.  Specifically, the GAL’s role ought to 
be well-defined, especially concerning the question under 
discussion—whether a GAL is empowered or required to 
engage in advocacy functions for the ward as the ward’s 
attorney.103 
In Ruffin, the appellant/defendant was incarcerated when 
served with a show cause order as to why he should not be 
declared a habitual offender.104  He was assigned a GAL for that 
matter.  In response, the appellant sent a letter to the court 
objecting to the GAL’s appointment, claiming that the lawyer 
assigned as GAL had represented him unsatisfactorily in a 
previous matter.105  The defendant heard nothing more of the 
matter.  Years later, he was arrested for driving and learned for 
the first time that he had been adjudged a habitual offender at 
the earlier proceeding; he was sentenced to prison.  On appeal 
he argued that his due process rights were violated in the 
previous case and his status as a habitual offender was void 
because he had objected to the GAL’s appointment.  The court 
had not appointed a replacement,106 and the GAL had not given 
him notice of the proceedings. 
The Court of Appeals held under Section 8.01-9 that the 
 
 102.  393 S.E.2d 425 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) overruled in part by Pigg v. 
Commonwealth, 441 S.E.2d 216, n.7 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (overruling Ruffin only to 
the extent it conflicts with Pigg’s holding that finding a convict statutorily 
“disabled” does not render such convict legally incompetent to transact business).  
Pigg did not discuss the role of a GAL but rather when to appoint one for convicts. 
 103.  See Ruffin, 393 S.E.2d at 426. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 429.  The defendant claimed that the circuit court should have 
appointed another attorney/GAL.  The Court of Appeals held that a defendant had 
no right to a GAL of his choosing; that was left to the discretion of the trial court. 
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order was void because the GAL did not timely contact the 
defendant concerning the hearing date or the result of the 
hearing.107  Accordingly, the main requirement of a GAL, as 
found in Section 8.01-9, is that he be “discreet, proper, and 
faithfully represent the interests of his charge.”  The court 
further held that the lawyer appointed as GAL under Section 
8.01-9 did not strictly act in an advocacy role.  Moreover, the 
GAL “did not have the right to assume that he was the 
defendant’s legal representative in any context other than as 
guardian ad litem.”108  What a “legal representative” is in the 
context of Section 8.01-9 is not clear.  In fact, the Court of 
Appeals noted that “[t]he duties of a guardian ad litem cannot be 
specifically spelled out as a general rule . . . .”109  The court, 
nonetheless, drew a bright line between a GAL acting in the 
capacity as a GAL and that of an attorney acting in a traditional 
attorney-client relationship.  The GAL was not an attorney qua 
attorney for the ward.  “He is not authorized to consent to 
anything except mere matters of formal procedure, such as 
maturing or expediting the cause.”110  The court further noted 
that the defendant had a right to receive “counsel of his 
choosing,”111 which clearly indicates that the GAL was not 
representing the ward as a lawyer-advocate. 
Apparently, that is the best the Court of Appeals could do 
to define a GAL’s responsibilities under Section 8.01-9. 
The Ruffin decision merely adds to the confusion concerning 
a GAL’s duties.  In Stanley, we were told that the GAL had the 
authority to file a petition for termination.  In other words, the 
GAL was filing pleadings as an advocate for the ward.  In 
Bottoms we saw the GAL engaged in a closing argument so the 
GAL was acting as his ward’s attorney-advocate.  However, in 
Ruffin we are told that a GAL was not the ward’s attorney, that 
 
 107.  Id.  
 108.  Id.  
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id.  
 111.  Id.  
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the defendant/ward had the right to an attorney of his choosing. 
Returning momentarily to Ruffin, the GAL, the defendant/ 
ward, and the Court of Appeals were all confused concerning 
the lawyer’s role.  Although asserting that the GAL had no right 
to assume that he was the defendant’s legal representative 
(whatever that means), the Court of Appeals used the term 
“client” when referring to the ward: “To hold that the guardian 
ad litem has a duty to report to the court every instance in which 
a client expresses displeasure with his services would unduly 
burden both the guardian and the Commonwealth.”112 
The use of the word “client” in reference to the ward is 
mystifying.  If the GAL/lawyer was not acting as the ward’s 
attorney, why use “client” when referencing the ward?113  On the 
defendant’s side of the equation, he too seems to have assumed 
that the lawyer appointed as GAL was acting in an attorney’s 
role as a lawyer/advocate.114 
It is unclear whether Virginia courts will continue to read 
Section 8.01-9 in conjunction with other statutes authorizing the 
appointment of GAL’s.  To some extent, the Court of Appeals in 
Verrocchio more precisely defined the contours of Section 8.01-9.  
However, the Supreme Court backtracked in Bottoms.  As noted, 
if Section 8.01-9 is tacked onto a GAL’s obligations every time a 
GAL is appointed under any statute, the consequences of doing 
so requires a GAL to consider that she may be required to 
 
 112.  Id. at 428 (emphasis added). 
 113.  As addressed more fully below, courts are often confused concerning a 
GAL’s obligations.  In Ruffin, the confusion could be attributed to the court’s poor 
choice of words, using “client” when the Court of Appeals should have used the 
word “ward.”  Obviously, if the defendant had in fact been the “client,” then that 
would mean the lawyer was acting as an attorney.  If so, then the defendant’s 
dissatisfaction and desire not to have the attorney/GAL represent him would have 
arguably required the attorney to withdraw because of a conflict of interest.  On the 
other hand, there are a number of reported decisions requiring a GAL to notify the 
court where a ward’s wishes differ from the GAL’s.  In either instance, the attorney 
has a duty to either withdraw or notify the court of the potential conflict. 
 114.  When the incarcerated appellant wrote the trial court that he was 
dissatisfied with the attorney’s previous representation, the attorney had 
apparently been his court-appointed lawyer pursuant to a typical attorney-client 
relationship.  This was yet an additional reason for the defendant to misunderstand 
the GAL’s role.  
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assume a more expansive role. 
Once the dust settles, a GAL’s obligations are unclear.  The 
doctrine of parens patriae, the prochein ami concepts embodied in 
Section 8.01-9, the language of Section 8.01-9, and the Statute 
must all be considered each time a GAL is appointed.  Given the 
confusion, it may be that a GAL is considered, practically 
speaking, as an advocate in the traditional sense 
notwithstanding Ruffin’s vagueness, which in the end adds 
nothing to the equation. 
Having examined the authority to appoint GALs and the 
duties and obligations in connection therewith, in Part IV we 
take a closer look at the GAL’s role. 
IV.  THE GAL’S ROLE: A CLOSER LOOK 
Depending on the complexity of the particular case and the 
individual GAL, a GAL may present evidence, cross-examine 
witnesses, give an opening and closing, and render an opinion 
on the ultimate issue.115  In addition, the GAL may testify in 
hearings prior to the capacity trial116 and at trial.  Whatever part 
the GAL plays, she has a significant impact not only on the 
course of the proceedings but the final result. 
Practicalities underlie the GAL’s extensive duties in the 
elder law context.  Courts are not in a position to investigate or 
monitor the Respondent’s condition, nor do they consider the 
parties capable of accurately conveying the putative ward’s 
status, which is why it is deemed practical to have a so-called 
 
 115. Cases that proceed to trial in the elder law context are often highly 
contested.  As in other types of litigation if the facts or legal issues are clear, they are 
usually settled prior to trial.  For example, in the elder law context if it is unclear 
whether the Respondent is incapacitated, then this issue will be tried.  Other areas 
that may not be as obvious involve disputes over who should be appointed 
guardian or conservator, or whether there should be a limited guardianship or 
conservatorship.   
 116. Prior to trial, various circumstances arise that may require a GAL’s 
testimony or opinion.  For example, there may be questions concerning whether the 
Respondent is safe in her home.  She may need to be relocated in order to receive 
proper medical treatment.  One of the family members may be abusing the 
Respondent or depleting the Respondent’s estate—in many instances pursuant to a 
power of attorney.    
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“independent” party to investigate and report their findings.117  
The GAL is viewed as an arm of the court.  She acts in an 
advisory role, ultimately submitting an oral and/or written 
opinion.118 
Given a GAL’s extensive role, it is not always clear whom 
they represent, if anyone.119 Often they appear to represent the 
Respondent.  In other words, it appears as if the Respondent is 
the GAL’s client, and as will be seen, from a legal and practical 
standpoint, this appearance has significant consequences.  At 
other times a GAL can be so aligned with one of the parties that 
they appear to be the “attorney” for that party.  For example, it 
can appear that the GAL represents an Intervenor.  Even if the 
fact-finder knows that the GAL is not technically the 
Intervenor’s attorney, the GAL’s advocacy-type activities—that 
is, what the GAL is doing during the proceeding—may leave the 
impression that the GAL is an attorney for one of the parties.  
Lastly, even in those rare circumstances where a GAL does not 
appear to be representing anyone, their role is so extensive that 
some authorities have deemed the GAL to be representing their 
own “position” or “opinion.”120 
The relevance of these impressions will become clearer as 
 
 117. As we have seen both in parental termination cases and child custody 
disputes, the courts, and of course Virginia’s General Assembly, recognize that the 
parties often have interests and motivations that may take precedence over the best 
interests of persons who are incapable of protecting themselves.  GALs are viewed 
as an answer to these problems.  
 118. The issues raised by a GAL’s Report are discussed in Part V. 
 119. As discussed below, GALs under the Statute technically do not represent 
anyone.  They are appointed to represent the Respondent’s “interests.”  As a 
precursor to the discussion that follows, is the foregoing statement/conclusion 
under Virginia law consistent with Wisconsin’s guardianship statute and the GAL’s 
role as identified therein?  In Wisconsin: 
The guardian ad litem shall be an advocate for the best interests of the 
proposed ward or alleged incompetent as to guardianship, protective 
placement and protective services. The [GAL] shall function 
independently, in the same manner as an attorney for a party to the action, 
and shall consider, but shall not be bound by, the wishes of the proposed 
ward or alleged incompetent or the positions of others as to the best 
interests of the proposed ward or alleged incompetent. 
Tamara L.P. v. Dane County, 503 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting 
Wis. Stat. § 880.331(3)). 
 120.  This is discussed in Parts V and VI.  
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these issues are discussed below.  Suffice it to say for now that 
impressions on the fact-finder are important because the GAL is 
cloaked with an air of neutrality and independence.  Moreover, 
the party opposing the GAL’s position is at a distinct 
disadvantage.121  In some instances, this disadvantage can be so 
debilitating and difficult to overcome that the party cannot get a 
fair trial. 
For the remainder of this Article, we examine these and 
other issues in connection with the GAL’s role. 
THE GAL AS INVESTIGATOR AND ADVISER 
A GAL is a buffer in the adversarial system.  She monitors 
and oversees the Respondent’s interests because at times the 
parties, often family members, are more interested in winning 
than in seeing to the Respondent’s interest.  (Recall the 
discussion above where GALs are appointed in the family law 
context.  It is necessary to appoint a GAL because parents often 
become so involved in “fighting” each other in court that they 
lose sight of their children’s interests.)  Courts strive to be fully 
informed, consistent with their oversight role as embodied in the 
doctrine of parens patriae.  Therefore, the GAL investigates122 and 
advises the court concerning a vast array of information.  As 
noted, the Statute requires the GAL to investigate the Petition 
and evidence.123  This statutory requirement virtually covers the 
universe of factual and legal issues presented. 
 
 121.  Whether the GAL is actually biased against a party or not, it often appears 
to one of the parties that that is the case.  See e.g., Kartalozi v. Kartalozi, No. A06-
1749 (Minn. Ct. App. July 24, 2007) (unpublished) (father claimed GAL did not 
properly investigate and ignored father’s evidence of positive interaction with his 
children); In the Matter of Choy, 919 A.2d. 801 (N.H. 2007) (father claimed GAL was 
biased because GAL failed to contact any of father’s witnesses). 
 122. In Ruffin, 393 S.E.2d at 429, the GAL failed to “thoroughly” investigate the 
facts surrounding a hearing where the defendant/ward was charged with driving 
after having been adjudicated a habitual offender.  The court stated that it was 
“clear that the guardian has a duty to make a bona fide examination of the facts in 
order to properly represent the person under a disability.”  Id.  Because the GAL 
did not do so, the order declaring the ward a habitual offender was void.  Id. 
 123. § 37.2-1003(B)(iv). 
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In connection with the duty to investigate and advise,124 a 
GAL often testifies. Nothing in the Statute allows this, but 
neither is it prohibited.  As seen below, testifying is common.125 
The GAL’s testimony also derives from practical considerations.  
Her investigatory obligation gives rise to the duty to advise the 
court of her findings, which may require testimony.  Because a 
GAL’s Report is not under oath,126 a party desiring to establish 
the legitimacy of the GAL’s recommendations may call the GAL 
to testify.127 
COURT DEFERENCE AND THE GAL’S SUBSTANTIAL ROLE 
The Statute requires a GAL to opine on the ultimate issues.  
The significance of this mandate cannot be fully appreciated in a 
factless vacuum.  What happens, for example, when the 
Respondent herself disagrees with the GAL’s assessment that 
she (the Respondent) is incapacitated?128  What impact does it 
have on the Petitioner or an Intervenor when the GAL, 
purportedly operating under a cloak of “neutrality,” opines on 
the ultimate issue?  What effect does it have on the fact-finder 
after observing the GAL introducing evidence, submitting an 
opening and closing, and then testifying? 
A number of cases illustrate the GAL’s considerable impact, 
 
 124. As noted, in Stanley, the mother appealed termination of her parental rights, 
claiming that the GAL acted only in an advisory role.  The Virginia Supreme Court 
disagreed: “[W]e have not regarded that role as merely advisory; instead, we have 
recognized that a guardian ad litem can appeal an adverse ruling . . . .” 405 S.E.2d at 
622 (citation omitted). 
 125. Parts V and VI examine the issues raised by an attorney testifying in the 
same case where she acts as an advocate. 
 126. Nothing in the Statute requires the Report to be under oath.  It merely 
requires that the Report to be filed. § 37.2-1003(B)(iv). 
 127. Of course the party seeking to discredit the Report may also call the GAL as 
a witness with the hope that the GAL will effectively withdraw some of the 
prejudicial information contained in the Report.  
 128.  A plethora of conflicts can arise between the Respondent and GAL.  For 
example, the Respondent may agree and realize that she requires some assistance, 
but may disagree that she needs to leave her home for a nursing home.  The 
Respondent might not think she needs a guardian.  The Respondent might vie for a 
limited guardianship or conservatorship, while the GAL believes a limited 
guardianship or conservator will not suffice.   
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and the deference accorded the GAL.129  Again, we look at 
decisions in and out of Virginia.130 
In Griffin v. Griffin,131 the appellant/husband argued that the 
trial court abused its discretion by awarding his wife sole 
custody of the children because the husband was a “wonderful 
father.”132  The decision was upheld based in large part on the 
GAL’s testimony.  The Court of Appeals noted first that the trial 
court had ordered the parties to cooperate and not to disparage 
the other.133  The appellate court further observed that the GAL 
had testified that he had not “seen” from the husband the kind 
of cooperation that he, the GAL, would have liked regarding 
encouraging the children’s relationship with their mother.134  
The GAL further testified that the children had told the GAL135 
 
 129.  Remarkably, even mere “concurrence” by a GAL in the trial court’s 
decision is seen as a basis for supporting a trial court’s decision.  The Court of 
Appeals in Verrocchio upheld the trial court’s ruling in a custody case, citing a 
Virginia Supreme Court decision upholding a trial court’s ruling based, in part, on 
the GAL’s mere “concurrence.”  429 S.E.2d at 486 (citing Kern v. Lindsay, 30 S.E.2d 
707, 710 (Va. 1944)).  On the other hand, in Ange v. York/Poquoson Department of 
Social Services, 560 S.E.2d 474 (Va. 2002), a mother appealed a circuit court’s 
summary dismissal of the mother’s appeal from the J&DR court that had 
terminated her parental rights.  The circuit court affirmed the J&DR’s termination 
without a trial because the mother had failed to comply with the circuit court’s pre-
trial deadlines.  Id. at 475.  The husband/appellee, at the Court of Appeals level, 
argued that there was sufficient evidence to affirm termination of the mother’s 
rights because the GAL had made the same recommendation.  The Court of 
Appeals disagreed, noting that the record was devoid of any indication that the 
GAL presented any testimony, filed a GAL Report, or even made 
recommendations.  All the GAL did was concur in the court’s ultimate rulings in 
the case, and that was insufficient. Id. at n.13. 
 130.  To some extent, we previously addressed court deference given a GAL’s 
opinion in Part III, noting that while the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bottoms is technically the final word, it is not, in fact, how a GAL’s opinion is 
actually considered in practice.  These issues will be further examined. 
 131.  No. 2810-08-4 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2009) (unpublished), available at 
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opncavwp/2810084.pdf. 
 132. Id. at 8.  The father’s appeal was based on a number of issues, but 
apparently, his primary argument on appeal was that the mother should not have 
been awarded sole custody because he was a “wonderful father.”  Consequently, 
the Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence in the record to ascertain whether it 
supported the trial court’s decision.  Relying in large part on the GAL’s Report and 
testimony, the court upheld the award of the children to the mother. Id.   
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. 
 135. Apparently, the appellant/husband did not challenge the GAL’s testimony 
regarding the children’s statements as hearsay.  
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that their father had instructed them to sneak out of the wife’s 
house.  The GAL did not “believe”136 that some of the children 
should be placed with the father and others with the mother.  
Finally, the GAL recommended that joint custody be 
terminated.137 
Similarly, in Andrews v. Creacey,138 the GAL played a critical 
role in the divorce of an incapacitated elderly man, and once 
again, the court’s position concerning the GAL was that of 
deference.139  The issue was whether the ward had formed the 
intent to remain permanently separate and apart from his wife.  
Without such intent, the divorce could not have been granted.140 
The primary evidence of the ward’s intent to remain 
separated derived from a GAL Report generated during the 
previous capacity proceeding under the Statute.141  During the 
incapacity proceedings, the appointed GAL had interviewed the 
Respondent and drafted a Report referencing the Respondent’s 
statement that he wanted a divorce.  That Report was admitted 
in the later divorce proceedings over the wife’s objection.142  It 
was stressed, however, that the trial court had admitted the 
GAL’s Report for one sentence only: “During our meeting [ ], 
Mr. Andrews expressed his desire to be divorced from his wife 
and the fact that two of his male children had been physically 
abusive to him.”143  The Court of Appeals affirmed the divorce, 
noting that the trial court found the GAL’s testimony “most 
reliable.”144 
 
 136. The decision repeatedly refers to the GAL’s “beliefs.”   
 137. Id. 
 138. 696 S.E.2d 218 (Va. Ct. App. 2010). 
 139. See id. at 228. 
 140. Id. at 223 (interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)). 
 141. After the ward had been declared incapacitated and after a guardian and 
conservator had been appointed, one of the co-guardians filed a petition for divorce 
on the Respondent’s behalf.  The wife opposed the divorce.  696 S.E.2d at 222. 
 142. Without success, the wife objected to the GAL’s Report because it contained 
multiple hearsay.  The Court of Appeals, however, admitted the hearsay under the 
state of mind exception.  Id. at 228.  
 143. Id. at 227–28. 
 144. Id. at 222. 
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Turning outside Virginia, in Gilbert v. Gilbert,145 Vermont’s 
Supreme Court addressed a GAL’s role and impact.  This case is 
perhaps the clearest enunciation and most accurate analysis of a 
GAL in any jurisdiction. 
The father had been granted custody, in large part based on 
the GAL’s recommendation.146  In Vermont, a GAL’s Report 
could not be considered absent the parties’ agreement, or unless 
the Report was based on admissible evidence.147  The Report 
contained a recommendation that the father have custody and 
was submitted to the court over the mother’s objection.148  The 
father argued that the Report was not essential to the trial 
court’s decision because all the information in the Report was 
ultimately entered into evidence.149  Therefore, it was cumulative 
and could not have prejudiced his wife. 
The Vermont Supreme Court held that the trial court had 
abused its discretion, resulting in an unfair hearing; the fact that 
the information contained in the Report ultimately found its way 
into evidence at trial “misse[d] the point of what went wrong at 
trial.”150 
The court emphasized that the GAL and her Report 
influenced the entire course of the proceedings.  The father’s 
 
 145. 664 A.2d 239 (Vt. 1995). 
 146. Id. at 240.  This decision is analyzed at greater length below because the 
opinion most accurately analyzes a GAL’s impact and role.  At first blush this case 
might not appear to be germane given the substantial differences between 
Virginia’s and Vermont’s regulatory framework.  However, the duties assumed by 
the GAL in Gilbert are consistent with those in Virginia.  The GAL acted in the 
child’s best interests, the GAL acted as a buffer for the child where the parents were 
antagonistic to the point that the child might suffer but for the appointment of an 
independent party, the GAL, to monitor and care for the child’s interests.  
 147. Id. at 241 (citing VT. R. FAMILY PROCEEDINGS 7(d)). 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 242.  The father also argued that the mother had waived her right to 
object to the Report’s admission because at a preliminary hearing she had agreed to 
admit the report, which at that time had not yet been created.  Id.  The Supreme 
Court disagreed, stating that Vermont’s Rule of Family Procedure 7(d) provides 
that a GAL “may” prepare a written Report and submit it to the parties, but 
submission to the Court is allowed only if both parties agree or if the Report 
complies with the rules of evidence.  The parties could only agree to admit the 
report after an opportunity to review it.  664 A.2d at 242. 
 150. Id.  
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attorney used the favorable Report as the foundation of his case 
to legitimize his client’s position, while the mother was in a 
position of having to counter the Report.  For example, the 
father’s attorney asked the mother on cross-examination if she 
were aware of the “guardian’s critical role in this case,” and if 
she was aware that the GAL was a “neutral” party appointed for 
the child.151  According to the court, “[t]he constant implication 
of the questioning was to validate the guardian’s investigation 
as comprehensive and neutral.”152  In addition, the Report was 
used to discredit the mother.  The GAL believed that the mother 
had inappropriately disciplined the child and placed too much 
emphasis on her work.  In other words, said the court, “the GAL 
report was the standard for all of the facts that could or should 
be found in the case, as well as the conclusions to be drawn from 
those facts.”153  In addition, the Report placed the mother in an 
unfair position because the GAL was not subject to cross-
examination.  The GAL was seen as “cloaked with neutrality by 
being independently appointed by the court.”154  Finally, 
references to the Report throughout the trial and the court’s 
“acceptance of the guardian’s expansive role” indicated that the 
Report had a “substantial impact” on the hearings and deprived 
the lower court of the “ability to make a fair and impartial 
decision.”155 
TO WHOM DOES THE GAL OWE HER PRIMARY ALLEGIANCE: THE 
COURT OR THE “CLIENT?” 
In addition to testifying, investigating, advising, opining, 
and reporting, the GAL, as seen in Part III, may be required to 
file pleadings on the Respondent’s behalf.156  To briefly revisit 
 
 151. Id. at 243. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. at 244. 
 156.  Pleadings are to be distinguished from the filing of the Report. 
13.2_EDDLEMAN_PRINT.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2012  6:46 AM 
2012] DUE PROCESS AND THE GAL 169 
Stanley,157 the mother/appellant challenged a GAL’s authority to 
file a petition to terminate her residual parental rights.  She 
unsuccessfully argued that the Virginia Code only authorized 
the Department of Social Services to file such a petition.158  The 
mother further argued that a GAL’s sole role was advisory.  The 
Supreme Court rejected her limited view, relying on Section 
8.01-9, which requires every GAL to “faithfully represent the . . . 
interest of the person under disability for whom he is 
appointed.”159  Consequently, in that case, part of the duty to 
faithfully represent the ward required the GAL to file 
“affirmative pleadings.”160 
Filing pleadings on another’s behalf is an advocacy 
function.  Filing pleadings clearly gives the impression that the 
person doing so, in this instance the GAL, represents someone.  
In Stanley, that someone was the child.  In the context of the 
Statute, that someone is the Respondent.  As seen, under Section 
37.2-1003(A), a GAL is appointed “to represent the interests of 
the respondent.” 
Representing the Respondent’s “interests” should be 
distinguished from representing the Respondent individually as 
a client.  In addition, Section 37.2-1003(B) provides that the GAL 
determines if counsel is necessary for the Respondent.  
Therefore, the Statute envisions a situation where the GAL acts 
as investigator and advisor, but not as an advocate.  However, as 
discussed in Part III, the GAL’s common law duties and Section 
8.01-9 may impose on the GAL an obligation to file pleadings on 
the Respondent’s behalf, transforming the GAL into an 
“attorney-advocate,” or at a minimum giving the appearance 
that an attorney-client relationship exists between the 
Respondent and the GAL. 
This gives rise to the question to whom does the GAL 
actually owe her primary allegiance: the Respondent or the 
 
 157.  405 S.E. 2d. 621 (Va. 1991) 
 158.  Id. at 623 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283). 
 159.  405 S.E.2d at 623. 
 160.  Id. at 622. 
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court?  The simple is answer is both.  The GAL has investigatory 
and advisory duties that are owed the court under the Statute, 
and also has advocacy functions under the Statute as well as 
under Section 8.01-9.  Logically speaking, however, one cannot 
have two primary allegiances; though practically speaking a GAL 
in the Statute’s context owes duties and allegiances to both the 
court and the Respondent.  These practical responsibilities flow 
from statutory and court-imposed mandates.  Essentially, the 
question boils down to what happens when there is a conflict, 
i.e., what happens when the duty owed the Respondent conflicts 
with the obligations and allegiances owed the court? 
It may be recalled that according to Ruffin: “It is the duty of 
the guardian ad litem to represent the interests of those for whom 
he is appointed faithfully and exclusively.”161  The GAL in Ruffin 
was appointed solely under Section 8.01-9, and if that statement 
of the law is accurate, there would appear to be no basis for 
concluding that the GAL owes any allegiance to anyone other 
than the Respondent, including the court.  Thus, if Section 8.01-9 
is read in conjunction with the Statute, then the GAL 
conceivably would not owe her primary or any other type of 
allegiance to the court because it is the GAL’s duty to exclusively 
represent the interests of the one to whom she is appointed. 
The key words under Ruffin’s interpretation of Section 8.01-
9—interests and exclusively—are significant and not merely 
semantics.  Concerning interests, Ruffin’s directive does not mean 
that the GAL represents the ward (or Respondent under the 
Statute) per se as a client.  As to exclusively, that also would 
appear to mean that a GAL owes her primary allegiance to the 
ward’s interests, not to the ward individually as a client, and not 
to the court. 
In contrast, when a lawyer represents a client qua client, she 
does so irrespective of her personal beliefs and opinions.  In 
other words, the client’s preferences prevail so long as those 
preferences are consistent with the law and the attorney’s ethical 
 
 161.  393 S.E.2d at 429 (emphasis added). 
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obligations.162 
Under the Statute, however, the GAL’s opinion “trumps” 
the Respondent’s wishes and desires because the GAL is 
required to do what the GAL thinks is best for the Respondent’s 
interests as distinguished from what the Respondent herself may 
desire.163  In theory, a GAL’s obligation to “exclusively” 
represent the Respondent’s interests, as opposed to what the 
Respondent wants, is not inconsistent as long as the GAL’s 
subjective beliefs do not conflict with the ward’s wishes. 
As noted, the Statute requires the GAL to consider the 
Respondent’s preferences regarding certain matters.164  But what 
happens when the Respondent’s preferences conflict with the 
GAL’s opinion?  For example, what if the GAL believes the 
Respondent should be placed in a nursing home?  What if the 
Respondent disagrees?  What does the GAL do? 
Under the Statute the GAL can ask the court to appoint 
counsel for the Respondent.  At this point, the GAL may proceed 
with her obligations, including the submission of the GAL’s 
opinion, notwithstanding that her opinion is contrary to the 
Respondent’s. 
It is imperative to consider the impact such conduct may 
have.  After a Petition is filed, the GAL is appointed to represent 
the Respondent’s interests.  As part of that statutory duty, the 
GAL begins her investigation, which includes interviewing the 
 
 162.  Virginia’s Disciplinary Rule 1.2, “Scope of Representation,” provides, in 
part: “A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation . . . and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they 
are to be pursued.”  Comment 1 states: “Both lawyer and client have authority and 
responsibility in the objectives and means of representation.  The client has ultimate 
authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation [within 
ethical bounds].” 
 163.  In fact, the GAL’s duties may require her to take a position directly 
contrary to what the ward wishes.  The GAL “is not bound by the wishes of the 
ward or the positions of others as to the ward’s best interests.”  Jennifer M. v. 
Maurer, 779 N.W.2d 436, 439 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotation and 
corresponding punctuation omitted).   
 164.  Section 37.1-1007 requires the court is to give “due deference to the wishes 
of the respondent” concerning who should be appointed guardian and/or 
conservator.  
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Respondent.165  Subsequently, the GAL may file motions for the 
Respondent’s benefit, for example, to secure funds or to obtain 
medical benefits during the pendency of the suit and prior to 
trial.  For all practical purposes, it appears as though the GAL is 
the Respondent’s attorney. 
This apparent attorney-client relationship creates an 
atmosphere that encourages the Respondent and perhaps one or 
more parties to make disclosures to the GAL that ultimately may 
be detrimental to the discloser.166  If the GAL later decides that 
the Respondent’s preferences are not in her best interests, the 
Statute requires the GAL to recommend something contrary to 
what the Respondent wishes.  Taking a contrary position to 
Respondent’s wishes may appear to be a betrayal of the 
confidences the Respondent and/or some other party reposed in 
the GAL.  The perception is that the GAL has violated the 
attorney-client relationship or at the least betrayed a confidence.  
This results because, under the Statute, the GAL owes her 
primary allegiance, not to the Respondent as “client,” but to the 
Respondent’s best interests, said “best interests” being 
determined by the GAL in her sole opinion. 
Therefore, the answer to the question to whom does the 
GAL owe her primary allegiance would appear to be to the 
ward’s best interests.  However, because the GAL’s obligations 
and the court’s parens patriae responsibilities are the same 
(ensuring that the ward’s best interests are served), in practice 
the GAL’s allegiance is seen as owed to the court.  She is 
 
 165.  Section 37.2-1003(B) requires the GAL to personally meet and interview the 
Respondent.  The Respondent may or may not have her own counsel at this point.  
 166.  Perceptions are significant because, as we shall see in Part VI, they have an 
impact on whether the proceedings appear to be fair and impartial.  Under 
Virginia’s attorney disciplinary rules, courts are to monitor attorneys’ behavior.  
The witness-advocate rules were enacted in part to ensure that judicial proceedings 
are fair and appear to be fair.  Therefore, when an attorney testifies in the same 
proceeding where she represents a party, the process can appear to be unfair 
because the testifying attorney takes an oath that is not available to the opposing 
party’s attorney.  The testifying attorney secures an advantage.  In addition, when a 
GAL testifies and participates in the proceeding where it appears as though the 
GAL is advocating one position or some party’s position, one of the parties is 
disadvantaged.  Finally, the disciplinary rules are not the only issues raised.  Due 
process concerns are also implicated.        
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required to investigate and determine what she thinks is in the 
ward’s best interests, and then to report that opinion to the 
court.  So when Ruffin states that the GAL’s duty is to represent 
the interests of those to whom she is appointed faithfully and 
exclusively, that is true only up to a point. 
The foregoing is not making a mountain out of the 
proverbial molehill.  Attorneys practicing in this arena fully 
appreciate that the GAL’s allegiance runs to the court.  They 
know that every communication with a GAL is potentially a 
communication to the court.  On the other hand, others, such as 
witnesses and the parties themselves, do not realize the 
significance of the fact that the GAL’s ultimate loyalty is to the 
court.  This insight tells only half of the story.  Witnesses’ and 
parties’ interactions with the GAL are indirect communications 
with the court, with the GAL acting as an intermediary.  Thus, 
communications with the GAL and what is ultimately related to 
the court is filtered through the GAL.  The GAL’s prejudices, 
biases, and motives influence her opinions and reports to the 
court.  As observed in the Introduction, the essential concern of 
this article revolves around human fallibility, personalities, and 
motives.  Given the GAL’s extensive and confusing role as well 
as her substantial impact on the proceedings, the fact that her 
primary allegiance is owed to the court must be considered. 
Turning outside Virginia, Maryland’s intermediate court 
addressed a bitter custody dispute in Auclair v. Auclair,167 finding 
that the children of the divorcing parents had no right to 
intervene as parties to their parents’ divorce action.168  In 
reaching its decision, the court addressed whether a GAL could 
adequately represent the children’s interests given that a GAL’s 
primary allegiance ran not to the children but to the court.  
According to the court, the children had no right to intervene 
 
 167. 730 A.2d 1260 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999). 
 168. Id. at 1276. Auclair pre-dates the Wills decision that was discussed in Part III, 
and its holding concerning the Maryland statute providing for the appointment of a 
GAL is flawed in light of Wills.  Nevertheless, Auclair accurately analyzes the issues 
concerning the GAL’s ultimate responsibility as owed to the court (as opposed to 
the ward).   
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because the GAL fully represented their interests, and the GAL’s 
primary obligation to the court was not deemed inconsistent 
with the GAL’s responsibilities to the children.169 
The court engaged in an extensive analysis of the GAL’s 
role.170  GALs filled an inherent void in child custody disputes.171  
Without a GAL, trial courts would be constrained to render 
decisions in the children’s best interests without any practical 
means to ensure that it had all the requisite information to guard 
the children’s interests.  Therefore, “[u]nhampered by the ex 
parte and other restrictions that prevent the court from 
conducting its own investigation . . . , the [GAL] essentially 
functions as the court’s investigative agent, charged with the 
same ultimate standard that must ultimately govern the court’s 
decision—i.e.,  the ‘best interests of the child.’”172  Finally, 
because a GAL functions as a court’s eyes and ears, “it owes its 
principal duty of allegiance [to the court], and not strictly as 
legal counsel to a child client.”173 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. The Wills court viewed the Maryland family law statute, Section 1-202, 
differently from Auclair.  The latter interpreted the statute as directing appointment 
of a lawyer as a GAL as that role is commonly viewed outside Maryland, and not as 
an “attorney” for the children in the sense where the lawyer advocates strictly as an 
attorney for the ward.  730 A.2d at 1268.  In other words, Auclair read § 1-202 to 
provide for the appointment of a GAL acting as GALs acted in other states.  The 
Wills court, however, noted that Maryland rarely used the term GAL.  
Consequently, the attorney in the Wills case had been appointed as an attorney in 
the strict attorney-client sense.  Because the attorney in Wills was not an “arm of the 
court” with purely investigatory and advisory duties, he was not immune from a 
malpractice action.  890 A.2d at 728.     
 171.  Indeed, whenever a GAL is appointed, whether in custody disputes or in 
capacity proceedings, Virginia courts, not to mention the General Assembly, believe 
GALs fill a void inherent in the proceedings.  The void derives from the perception 
that the parties in the proceedings have interests that are inconsistent with the 
ward’s; therefore, the parties may not fully bring to the court’s attention relevant 
matters pertaining to the ward.  E.g., Verrochio, 429 S.E.2d at 484 (“Unfortunately, 
experience has shown that the question of custody, so vital to a child’s happiness 
and well-being, frequently cannot be left to the discretion of parents.  This is 
particularly true where, as here, the estrangement of husband and wife beclouds 
parental judgment with emotion and prejudice.” (quoting Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 
193 (1962)).  In the context of a capacity hearing, it is often the Respondent’s 
children or other family members whose judgment is “beclouded.”        
 172.  Auclair, 730 A.2d at 1268. 
 173.  Id.  As previously noted, one way to characterize the issues presented 
herein is to ask, how much of an attorney is the GAL, and how much of a client is 
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Virginia would follow Auclair’s rationale, namely that while 
a GAL is required to represent the Respondent’s interests 
faithfully and exclusively, that “rule” is not inconsistent with a 
GAL’s obligations and allegiance to the court.  The Statute 
requires a GAL to represent the Respondent’s interests.  Section 
8.01-9 requires the GAL to represent the Respondent’s interests.  
Finally, under the doctrine of parens patriae the court itself is 
obligated to protect those before it who cannot protect 
themselves.  Given such a reading, no conflict exists unless one 
views the issue from the Respondent’s or other party’s 
perspective.  It bears restating that it is true that the GAL 
represents the Respondent’s interests exclusively as long as it is 
understood that such representation is qualified: a GAL is not 
“strictly” legal counsel for the Respondent; the GAL represents 
the Respondent’s interests as she, the GAL, thinks fit.  Stated 
differently, her opinion controls, and that is different from the 
attorney-client context where the client “calls the shots.” 
THE GAL AS A “PARTY” 
Part III introduced the Stanley decision, where the Virginia 
Supreme Court rejected the assertion that a GAL’s role was 
merely advisory.  Recall that the appellant argued that a GAL 
did not have the authority to file a petition for termination of 
parental rights.  In disagreeing, the Supreme Court observed 
that a GAL “certainly has a legitimate interest in whether his 
ward is to be subjected to continued abuse and neglect.”174 
The issue under consideration is how much of an interest 
does a GAL have in the proceedings, and is the GAL a party?  As 
discussed below, at one time the GAL in certain instances was 
considered an indispensable or necessary party.  Because of this 
status, the GAL was required to be served with notice of any 
appeal to the Court of Appeals.  If not served, the Court of 
 
the client.  In this instance, the court found that the GAL/attorney did not strictly 
act as the children’s attorney.  
 174.  Stanley, 405 S.E.2d at 623.   
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Appeals lacked any jurisdiction to hear the matter.  However, 
service was not always required because in some instances the 
GAL was not considered by the courts to be a necessary party. 
In response to this view, the Virginia Supreme Court Rules 
were amended.  These amendments elevate a GAL’s status, 
arguably evidencing their significance.  At present, Part Five A 
of the Virginia Supreme Court Rules governs all proceedings in 
the Court of Appeals and requires GALs to be served with notice 
in all instances.175  The amendments evidence Virginia’s 
perspective that a GAL must have some input at the appellate 
level.  In other words, a GAL is so situated in the context of the 
proceedings that failure to give notice defeats jurisdiction.  At a 
minimum, the requirement that GALs be served and allowed to 
participate on appeal further undermines the holding in 
Bottoms176 that a GAL’s opinion while not irrelevant, should not 
be disregarded.  Simply put, the appellate courts are required to 
hear from GALs.  
Before addressing the amendments to the Virginia Supreme 
Court Rules, we address the case law giving rise to them. 
In Yopp v. Hodges,177 the Court of Appeals held that the 
failure to serve the GAL with notice of an appeal did not defeat 
appellate jurisdiction.  Under Rule 5A:6, the party appealing a 
case must deliver or mail a copy of the notice of appeal to all 
“opposing counsel.”178  The question, then, was whether the 
GAL was “opposing counsel.”179  If so, then the GAL had to be 
served with the notice of appeal. 
In a prior case, Hughes v. York County Department of Social 
Services,180 the Court of Appeals held that notice to a GAL was 
required.  However, Hughes was distinguishable because the 
GAL there was considered “opposing counsel,” an “appellee,” 
 
 175.  VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:1(a), (c)(3) (2012).  
 176.  457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (Va. 1995).  This decision is further discussed in Part V.  
 177.  598 S.E.2d 760, 763 (Va. App. 2004). 
 178.  Id.  
 179.  The court answered in the negative, interpreting “opposing counsel” to 
include “indispensable” parties, of which the GAL was not one.  Id.  
 180.  548 S.E.2d 237 (Va. App. 2001).  
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and a “necessary party.”181  The GAL was considered an 
“appellee,” because he had taken a position in opposition to the 
appellant.  The GAL was also deemed an “appellee,” because 
the GAL was an “indispensable party. “182  According to Hughes, 
an “indispensable party” constituted “opposing counsel” as well 
as an “appellee” for purposes of Rule 5A:6 because in a parental 
termination case, the appointment of a GAL was required.183  
The Yopp court defined an indispensable party as:  
one who is in the actual enjoyment of the subject 
matter, or has an interest in it[,] which is likely to be 
defeated or diminished by the plaintiff’s claim[;] in 
such case he has an immediate interest in resisting the 
demand, and all persons who have such immediate 
interests are necessary [indispensable] parties to the 
suit.184  
The Yopp case involved a custody dispute, and under 
Section 16.1-266(E), the appointment of a GAL was 
discretionary.  Consequently, because courts routinely heard 
custody disputes without appointing a GAL, the GAL was not 
considered a necessary party, and the failure to give notice did 
not deprive the Yopp court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal.185 
Turning to the Virginia Supreme Court Rules, one sees a 
concerted effort to avoid the complex parsing and analysis 
undertaken by the Court of Appeals.  As noted, the rules require 
service on a GAL, thus ensuring a GAL’s input at the appellate 
level.  Rule 5A:1(c)(3) expands “Counsel of Record” under Rule 
1:5 to include a GAL.  Rule 5A:1(c)(5) defines “counsel for 
appellee” as a GAL, unless the GAL is the appellant.  Therefore, 
 
 181.  Id. at 239. 
 182.  Id.  
 183.  Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266A. 
 184.  598 S.E.2d at 763.  Notably, the dissent in Yopp argued that Hughes required 
dismissal of the appeal because the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction.  Id. at 767–
68.  The dissent argued that a GAL was an indispensable party no matter what 
statute she was appointed under because the child’s “interests are subject to being 
defeated or diminished by the mother’s [appellant’s] claim in this appeal.”  Id. at 
768.  In addition, the dissent argued that the GAL in Yopp was counsel of record 
under Virginia Supreme Court Rule 1:5 and, therefore, notice of appeal was 
required under that rule.  Id. at 767, n.6.  
 185.  Id. at 764. 
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when Rule 5A:6 requires service of the notice on “opposing 
counsel” the GAL is included.  In addition, Rule 5A:19, setting 
forth the general requirements for briefs at the Court of Appeals 
level, provides that if a GAL joins with either the appellee or 
appellant, the GAL is required to notify the clerk of the Court of 
Appeals.  The GAL may then rely on her side’s brief but is 
herself entitled to oral argument under Rule 5A:26.186 
At this point, we see that a Virginia GAL acts as an 
investigator, witness, and neutral advisor opining on the 
ultimate issues.  In addition, the GAL is obliged to file 
affirmative pleadings at the trial level and is considered a de facto 
indispensable party and opposing counsel with rights to 
appellate argument separate from the other parties.  It is not a 
stretch to say that a Virginia GAL187 is virtually in a category by 
herself, loosed upon the litigation with fluctuating obligations 
and duties running sometimes to the court, at times to 
Respondent’s “interests,” and finally with allegiances to her own 
opinion, such opinion taking precedence over the Respondent’s 
because, as seen, the Respondent is not the GAL’s client, and the 
GAL is not, strictly speaking, the Respondent’s attorney. 
V.  THE WRITTEN REPORT 
The Statute specifies the contents of the GAL’s written 
Report.188  However, the statutory requirements cannot be 
completely satisfied without considering the GAL’s duties as 
identified in the Statute,189 together with the GAL’s common-law 
obligations.  When all three are read together, one can safely 
posit that the Report should190 encompass the entire factual and 
 
 186.  E.g., Bennett v. Bennett-Smith, No. 1852-07-1 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2008) 
(unpublished) (GAL joined with mother on appeal but declined oral argument).  
 187.  This is not to imply that a Virginia GAL is unique.  If that is not clear by 
now, it should be as this article proceeds.  The duties and responsibilities of GALs 
are in disarray nationwide and have been for decades. 
 188.  § 37.2-1003(C) 
 189.  § 37.2-1003(B) 
 190.  “Should” is used because the scope and contents of a Report varies from 
case to case.  In practice, they can vary in length from five to sixty-five pages, 
depending on the relief sought in the Petition, the issues raised, and the 
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legal issues involved in the particular case. 
Section 37.2-1003(B) specifies the GAL’s duties, requiring 
her to investigate the Petition and evidence.  This section also 
requires the Report to be filed, so clearly the requirement to 
investigate the Petition and evidence encompasses the full scope 
of the capacity proceedings.  In addition, Section 37.2-1003(C), 
the portion of the Statute setting forth the Report’s contents, 
requires the GAL to address the “major areas of concern,”191 
including whether a guardian or conservator is needed, the 
extent and powers of the proposed guardian and conservator, 
the suitability of the proposed guardian and conservator, the 
guardian’s and conservator’s ability to satisfy their duties, and 
consideration of the Respondent’s proper residential placement.  
These areas of concern are indeed major, encompassing 
essentially the gamut of the issues before the court. 
Given the Report’s breadth, additional questions arise.  
What weight should the fact-finder give the Report?  Should the 
Report be admitted as “substantive” evidence?  If so, should the 
trial court allow the introduction of the entire Report as 
evidence?192  Related to that, what if the Report contains 
hearsay?  In fact, is the Report itself hearsay?  Should the Report 
be submitted under oath?  When should the Report be filed with 
the court and/or served on parties? 
The weight to be given a Report begins with In the Matter of 
Baby K (“Baby K”),193 goes through Ruffin,194 and ostensibly ends 
with Bottoms.195  Ostensibly is used because the Virginia Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement in Bottoms does not accurately reflect 
Virginia law. 
In Baby K, a child was born in a Virginia medical facility 
 
conscientiousness of the particular GAL.    
 191.  § 37.2-1003(C)(i)–(iv). 
 192.  Section 37.2-1003(B) requires the Report to be filed with the court, but is 
silent as to whether the Report is admitted into evidence.  Section 37.2-1003(B) also 
does not specify the weight to be given to a Report.    
 193.  832 F.Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
 194.  393 S.E.2d 425 (Va. Ct. App. 1990), discussed in Part III. 
 195.  457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995). 
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with irreparable brain damage.  She was unconscious, deaf, 
blind, and could not experience pain or pleasure.196  The medical 
provider filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court 
seeking a ruling that if the provider discontinued the child’s 
ventilator, doing so would not violate certain federal and state 
laws.197  To further complicate matters, the mother and the father 
disagreed as to whether their child should be allowed to die. 
A Virginia state court had previously appointed a GAL 
pursuant to Section 8.01-9.  The GAL sided with the father and 
medical facility, opining that the ventilator ought to be 
discontinued.198  It was in this context that the Baby K court 
found the GAL’s role to be merely a fact finder.  The federal 
court’s opinion was based on Ruffin.199  Consequently, a Virginia 
GAL’s recommendation was “irrelevant.”200  Dismissing a GAL’s 
recommendation was deemed consistent with the “limited role 
of a [GAL] as an independent fact finder and not a surrogate 
decisionmaker . . . .”201  Relying on Ruffin, the federal court 
reasoned that a GAL’s role under Section 8.01-9 is to “‘carefully 
examine[ ] the facts surrounding the case.’”202 
The federal court’s interpretation of Ruffin misses the mark 
because as we have seen, Stanley determined a GAL’s role is not 
merely advisory.203  The federal court not only overlooked 
Stanley, but misread Ruffin.  In Ruffin, the Virginia Supreme 
Court determined that Section 8.01-9 established a GAL’s 
minimum qualifications.204  In addition, Virginia’s Supreme 
 
 196.  832 F.Supp. at 1025. 
 197.  Id. at 1031.  The court held that the Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the American with Disabilities Act, and 
the Child Abuse Act would not allow the medical provider to discontinue the 
ventilator.  Id.  The court declined to address whether the Virginia Medical 
Malpractice Act and the “right to die” took precedence over the mother’s 
constitutional rights concerning Baby K’s care.  Id.  
 198.  Id. at 1026. 
 199.  Id. at n.2. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Id. (quoting Ruffin, 393 S.E.2d at 429). 
 203.  405 S.E.2d 621, 622 (Va. 1991). Stanley is discussed in Part III. 
 204.  393 S.E.2d at 428. 
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Court observed that a GAL’s duties could not be “spelled out as 
a general rule.”205  However, it was clear that the GAL had “a 
duty to make a bona fide examination of the facts in order to 
properly represent the person under a disability.”206 
Stated differently, Ruffin’s analysis of a GAL’s duties was 
not the totality of a GAL’s obligations.  The Virginia Supreme 
Court also said that a GAL had a duty to “faithfully represent 
and protect” his charge.207  Clearly, this meant something 
beyond merely acting as a fact finder and advisor.  In addition, 
“faithfully” representing the ward in the context of the Baby K 
case could have included recommending that the ventilator be 
removed.  Moreover, as other courts and litigants have noted, if 
a GAL’s Report and opinion are irrelevant, then why have them? 
Virginia’s Supreme Court expressly disagreed with the Baby 
K holding in Bottoms, finding that a GAL’s recommendation 
“while not binding or controlling, should not be disregarded.”208 
The evolution from Baby K’s finding that a GAL’s 
recommendation is irrelevant to Bottoms’s holding is not much 
guidance.  In fact, Bottoms substantially understates the weight 
given GALs’ recommendations.  Practically speaking, their 
recommendations are given far more weight, not only by trial 
courts but also at the appellate level as seen in the discussion 
 
 205.  Id. at 429. 
 206.  Id.  
 207.  Id. at 428. 
 208.  457 S.E.2d at 108.  The facts in Bottoms are somewhat unique.  Four 
different levels of courts were involved: (1) J&DR; (2) circuit court; (3) the Court of 
Appeals, and (4) the Supreme Court.  At the appellate level, the issues were 
somewhat charged given the facts.  As mentioned, the case involved a child custody 
dispute between the child’s mother and the child’s maternal grandmother.  Id. at 
103.  The child’s mother was involved in a lesbian relationship.  Id. at 105.  The 
child’s grandmother sought custody, claiming that the mother had abused and 
neglected the child.  Id. at 106.  The two lower trial courts that heard the evidence 
(J&DR and the circuit court) both ruled that custody should be awarded to the 
grandmother because there was sufficient evidence that the mother had neglected 
and abused the child.  The Court of Appeals reversed.  Id. at 107.  The Supreme 
Court reversed the Court of Appeals.  Id.  At the appellate level, the courts seemed 
to be sparring over the lesbian issue.  Id. at 108.  The Supreme Court’s analysis was 
simple: the judges who heard the evidence and judged the credibility of the 
witnesses determined that there had been abuse and neglect, and that finding was 
entitled to deference.  Id. at 107, 108. 
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above.  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s determination in Bottoms 
that a GAL’s opinion, while not controlling is not to be 
disregarded, is inconsistent with the weight accorded the GAL’s 
Report in the same decision.  The Supreme Court buttressed its 
holding, relying on not only Section 8.01-9 and Rule 8:6, but also 
the GAL’s common law obligations and a trial court’s 
obligations under parens patriae.  “This child had no other 
independent participant in the proceeding, aside from the trial 
court, to protect his interests.  Thus, this diligent guardian ad 
litem’s recommendation that custody be awarded to the 
grandmother was entitled to be considered by the court in 
reaching a decision on the issue.”209 
Given Bottoms’ view concerning a GAL’s recommendations 
the question of whether the Report should be admitted as 
“substantive” evidence would seem to be answered in the 
negative.  In other words, if a GAL’s recommendations amount 
to nothing more than something for the trial court’s 
consideration, then logically a Report should not be deemed 
substantive evidence. 
Virginia has not addressed this issue.  There are, however, 
decisions outside the jurisdiction meriting consideration. 
In C.J.L. v. M.W.B. (“M.W.B.”),210 an intermediate appellate 
court in Alabama addressed both the weight and admissibility 
of a Report.  A mother appealed a decision granting sole custody 
to her husband, arguing that the trial court unduly relied on a 
GAL’s Report and erred admitting it.211  She further claimed that 
her due process rights had been violated given the GAL’s 
expansive role.212 
Consistent with the principles set forth in Bottoms and 
Ruffin, Alabama law allows trial courts to consider a Report, but 
they are not bound by a GAL’s recommendation.213  Because 
 
 209.  Id. at 108. 
 210. 879 So.2d. 1169 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). 
 211. Id. at 1172. 
 212. Id. at 1181.  Part VI examines a number of cases concerning this issue. 
 213. Id. 
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Alabama law “clearly permits the use” of a GAL in custody 
cases, because a GAL under the Alabama statute was required to 
make a recommendation, and because it was “inherent in the 
definition” of a GAL to make a recommendation, the use and 
admission of the Report was not error.214  Moreover, because the 
GAL was a licensed attorney and officer of the court, the GAL 
was further permitted to argue his “client’s case” as any other 
lawyer.215  Finally, the court declined to “reconsider” the 
longstanding use of GALs by Alabama trial courts.216 
In In the Matter of Hilyard,217 an appeal also involving child 
custody, the appellant/grandmother sought custody of ten 
grandchildren after their parents’ rights had been terminated 
and custody was awarded to the State of Ohio.  The trial court 
appointed a lawyer to act as a GAL and attorney for children.218  
The grandmother argued she was prejudiced by the Report’s 
admission, because it contained hearsay, without which the 
record did not substantiate the decision to place the children 
with the state.219 
Similar to the Virginia Statute, an Ohio GAL Report was to 
be submitted to the trial court.220  Moreover Ohio law, like the 
Virginia Statute, was silent concerning whether the Report was 
admissible.221  The appellee state agency conceded that the 
Report contained hearsay but argued: “what is the use of 
requiring the report if the court cannot use it?”222 
 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. (quotation omitted). 
 216. Id.  
 217. 2006-Ohio-1977, ¶ 1 (Ct. App.). 
 218. Id. at ¶ 7.  The grandmother argued that the trial court should have 
appointed a separate advocate attorney for the children, arguing that the dual roles 
of advocate and GAL were impermissible.  Id. at ¶ 4.  The appellant had failed to 
make this objection at trial.  See id. at ¶ 47. 
 219. Id. at ¶ 53, 58-59. 
 220. Id. at ¶ 54; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414 (the GALs report “shall be 
submitted to the court”).  As noted, Virginia’s Statute requires that the Report be 
filed.  See also the following footnote. 
 221. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(C) (requiring the Report to be 
“submitted” to the court before or at the time of the permanent custody hearing.)  
On Ohio GAL Report, as in Virginia, is not submitted under oath.  
 222. Hilyard, 2006-Ohio-1977 at ¶ 54.  
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The appellate court determined that the Report’s admission 
was error.  Moreover, the fact that the statute required its 
submission did not make it admissible.223  However, the mere 
fact that the Report was improperly admitted did not mean the 
appellant was prejudiced because the GAL was subject to cross-
examination and the record substantiated the trial court’s 
decision.224 
In In Re Chelsea,225 a Maine statute expressly allowed a 
Report to be admitted.226  Despite that, a mother in a custody 
proceeding argued that her due process rights had been violated 
because the Report contained inadmissible hearsay.227  There 
was no question, said the court, that the legislature could 
empower courts to consider Reports as an exception to the 
hearsay rule.228  However, the ultimate issue was whether the 
court’s consideration of the Report prejudiced the mother.229 
In balancing the mother’s rights to her children, the appeals 
court observed that there were sufficient safeguards offsetting 
the risk of untrustworthy hearsay information in a Report.  One 
such safeguard involved the fact that a GAL was a 
 
 223. Id. at ¶ 54, 55, 58.  The court noted that an Ohio “task force” had 
recommended that Reports not be considered as “substantive proof of the merits.” 
Id. at ¶ 56.  Another committee had indicated that a GAL’s role was advisory.  Id. at 
¶ 57.  In addition, the Report was viewed as a mechanism for allowing trial courts 
to ascertain if the GAL had fulfilled her duties.  However, the committee cautioned 
against using the Report as “substantive evidence.”  Id.   
 224.  Id. at ¶ 58-62.  This decision, as with others, fails to adequately consider the 
impact of the Report as well as the GAL’s role.  As noted, Gilbert, 664 A.2d 239, 
supra note 145, reasoned that even though much of the evidence in the GAL’s 
Report eventually made its way into the record, which purportedly rendered the 
admission of the GAL’s Report of no harm, the fact is the appellant was put into the 
position of having to contradict the evidence of a “neutral” party (the GAL) 
appointed by the court.   Accordingly, the entire proceeding was influenced by the 
Report, and the Report became the “standard for all of the facts . . . as well as the 
conclusions to be drawn from those facts.” Id. at 243.  The Report’s admission 
placed the mother in an unfair position, and “significantly influence[d] the 
outcome” in the case.  Id. at 244.  
 225. 884 A.2d. 97 (Me. 2005). 
 226. Id. at ¶ 1 (citing ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 4005(1)(D) (2004)). 
 227. 884 A.2d. 97 at ¶7.  
 228. Id. at ¶ 10. 
 229. Id. at ¶ 11. 
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“disinterested party” and an “agent” of the court.230  Secondly, 
the GAL had to meet certain qualifications and exhibit 
competence and experience concerning the reliability of 
information presented in the Report.  Thirdly, the GAL was 
required to provide copies of the Report to all parties, and the 
Report was to include the identity of the referred witnesses in 
advance of trial.231  The mother argued, however, that even if the 
Report were admissible, statements of witnesses who were not 
called to testify ought to be redacted.  Similar to the Alabama 
court in M.W.B., the Chelsea court rejected the argument, stating 
that redaction would negate the purpose of a GAL, which is to 
“conduct an investigation, recommend what action is in the best 
interests of the child, and outline the reasons for those 
conclusions.”232 
Before considering in more depth the hearsay issues in 
relation to Reports, the final two questions are whether there 
should be a service requirement, and whether the Report should 
be under oath.  As noted, the Statute does not require Reports to 
be submitted under oath or served.  They are merely filed with 
the court with no established time for submission.  For now, it 
suffices to say that there are considerable reasons for requiring 
service on all parties, including the Respondent, as well as 
requiring the Report to be served sufficiently in advance of trial 
to allow challenges.  Similarly, for present purposes it suffices to 
note that there are sound reasons why the Report should be 
submitted under oath.  More comprehensive answers to these 
questions can be provided after considering the issues in Part VI 
as well as the next section addressing hearsay and Reports. 
To summarize, a GAL’s Report contains opinions regarding 
the ultimate issues in a capacity hearing.  Whether the Report 
 
 230. Id. at ¶ 14 (citing ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 4005(1)(G)). 
 231. Id.  Although the Maine statute requires the Report to be provided to the 
parties, it does so with the proviso that it be done “reasonably” in advance of trial.  
§ 4005(1)(D).  The question is whether providing the Report “reasonably” in 
advance of trial allows any party opposing the Report to counter it by subpoenaing 
witnesses or by taking any other steps. 
 232. 884 A.2d. 97 at ¶15 (citing § 4005). 
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should be admitted and its proper weight are substantial issues 
requiring additional consideration in Virginia.  As seen, Bottoms 
is an incomplete and limited statement of law regarding the 
proper weight to be afforded a GAL’s opinion.  Whether there 
should be service requirements and time limits for service and 
filing are vital considerations that will also be addressed below. 
THE REPORT AND HEARSAY 
The vast majority of Reports contain hearsay given their 
nature and contents.  In addition and as important, the Report 
itself is hearsay.233 
Hearsay is a statement (oral or written) not made by one 
testifying at trial, if the statement is offered as proof of the 
matter set forth in the statement.234  A GAL’s Report is generated 
outside the context of a hearing.  If offered as evidence, it is by 
definition offered to prove the truth of the Report’s contents, 
namely that the GAL’s findings and opinions are true. 
Hearsay is generally inadmissible, but there are a 
substantial number of exceptions, and the party introducing the 
out-of-court statement has the burden of showing that it meets 
an exception.235 
No Virginia statute expressly allows a GAL’s Report to be 
introduced as a hearsay exception.  As noted, Section 37.2-
1003(B)(iv) requires a Report to be filed.  That does not mean, 
however, that it is admissible.  On the other hand, it could be 
argued that the General Assembly impliedly authorized the 
introduction of Reports by enacting a statute requiring their 
filing.236  And, as noted in Hilyard, why have a Report unless it 
 
 233. Effective July 2012, an evidentiary code becomes effective in the 
Commonwealth for the first time in Virginia's history.  VA. CODE ANN., tit. 8.01. 
 234. Andrews v. Creacey, 696 S.E.2d 218, 228 (Va. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Black’s 
Law Dictionary 649 (5th ed. 1979)). 
 235. Brown v. Commonwealth, 487 S.E.2d 248, 251 (Va. Ct. App. 1997). 
 236. In Coston v. Petrie, 586 N.W.2d 52, 59 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998), supra note 23, the 
court addressed the issue of whether a psychologist’s report required by the 
guardianship statute was admissible although objected to as hearsay.  Even though 
the report was required to be prepared the court held that that did not mean the 
13.2_EDDLEMAN_PRINT.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2012  6:46 AM 
2012] DUE PROCESS AND THE GAL 187 
can be used?  But using the Report is not the same as admitting 
it into evidence.  On the other hand, if courts are expressly 
allowed to consider Reports, and if the Reports are not 
“admitted” but merely “filed,” how is a party to counter the 
Report? 
One method entails calling the GAL as a witness.  Tactically 
speaking, this may not be a viable option because, as seen, a 
GAL wears a cloak of neutrality by virtue of being court-
appointed to monitor and guard the Respondent’s best interests. 
As discussed above in Creacey,237 a wife challenged a trial 
court’s divorce decree, arguing that a Report’s admission was 
improper because it contained hearsay.  As noted, the Report 
involved a GAL’s meeting with a husband during his incapacity 
hearing, which report was introduced by his appointed 
guardian as evidence of intent when his guardian later filed for 
his divorce.238  The wife, who objected to the divorce, claimed 
that absent admission of the Report, there was insufficient 
evidence to prove that her husband intended to live separate 
and apart from her.239 
In holding that the Report’s admission was not error, the 
Court of Appeals determined that the hearsay therein was a 
recognized exception.  The issue was whether the husband 
intended to live separate and apart; that is, his “state of mind” 
was at issue.  Thus, the hearsay concerning his “state of mind” 
was admissible.240  Even if the Report’s admission were error, the 
court opined that it was harmless because the GAL testified 
subject to cross-examination concerning these statements and 
did so without objection.241 
The Court of Appeals’ decision in Creacey is not the last 
 
report was an exception to the hearsay rule:  “If the legislature had intended for the 
report to be admitted into evidence at trial as an exception to the hearsay rule, it 
would have said so.  It did not.”  Id. (quotation omitted).  
 237. Cited and discussed above in Part IV, n.235.   
 238. The Creacey court declined to address whether a guardian was empowered 
to seek a divorce under VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1020(D).  696 S.E.2d at 223. 
 239. Id. at 226. 
 240. Id. at 228. 
 241. Id.  
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word in Virginia because the Report was not challenged in a 
capacity hearing but in a divorce proceeding.  However, Creacey 
is the only reported Virginia decision addressing hearsay in 
connection with a Report.242  The opinion raises significant issues 
concerning the interplay between a Report’s admission and 
cross-examination.  As noted above and as will be addressed 
more fully below, courts outside Virginia often justify the 
admission of hearsay-laden Reports by finding that the sting or 
prejudicial impact of their admission is ameliorated if the GAL is 
subject to cross-examination. 
Such was the case in Hilyard,243 and as in Griffin, the 
appellant objected to a Report’s admission, arguing that the trial 
court did not properly consider the children’s preferences.  
Instead their preferences were documented through the GAL’s 
Report and testimony, i.e., hearsay.  The appellate court agreed 
there was error but affirmed because any error was harmless; 
there was no prejudice because the GAL was subject to “full 
cross-examination” at trial.244  In addition, there was evidence 
beyond the GAL’s Report documenting the children’s 
preferences.245 
 
 242. In Mercurio v. Mercurio, No. 0401-09-2, (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2009) 
(unpublished) available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opncavwp/040 
1092.pdf, the mother/appellant in a custody suit challenged the admission of a 
GAL’s Report that was submitted the day before the custody hearing.  Id. at 4.  The 
mother argued that the trial court should not have considered the Report, in part, 
because it contained inadmissible hearsay.  The decision notes that the Report was 
not admitted as evidence although the trial court indicated that it had “seen” the 
GAL’s recommendation.  Id.  Because the mother/appellant had not complied with 
appellate rules mandating that the appellant’s opening brief include the principles 
and arguments relating to the appeal, the issue was not addressed by the Court of 
Appeals. Id.  See also Griffin, No. 2810-08-4 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2009) 
(unpublished) (GAL Report “produced to the court” but opinion does not state 
whether admitted as evidence), discussed above in Part IV at note 131.  The GAL in 
Griffin testified about and submitted a Report containing extensive statements by 
the children to the GAL concerning their preference as to where they wanted to 
live.  Id. at 10.  When the appellant/father was not awarded custody, he appealed 
claiming the trial court did not properly consider the children’s preferences as 
required by statute.  Id.  The Court of Appeals found no error concerning the 
Report’s use.  Apparently, the father did not raise any hearsay objections at trial.  Id. 
at 5–6. 
 243. 2006-Ohio-1977, supra note 218. 
 244. Id. at ¶ 60. 
 245. Id. at ¶ 6.  Similarly in In the Matter of K.G., No. W2003-00809-COA-R3-PT 
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In Toms v. Toms 246 the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that 
a GAL’s Report itself was hearsay and reversed a custody 
determination based solely on a Report.  Tennessee’s Rules of 
Evidence define hearsay as “‘a statement, other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’”247  By 
definition, a GAL’s Report constitutes hearsay, said the court.  It 
is an out-of-court statement, introduced for the truth of the 
statements therein.  Therefore, in lieu of admitting the Report, a 
GAL should testify subject to cross-examination.248  However, if 
the GAL’s testimony contained hearsay, it must be admissible as 
an exception.249  Finally, “[a]lthough a guardian ad litem’s report 
is not admissible evidence, we hold that such a report may be 
reviewed by a trial court.  To hold otherwise would effectively 
undermine the important role played by a guardian ad litem.”250 
As seen, in some states, a Report’s admission is justified if 
the record shows harmless error, i.e., if other evidence 
substantiates the Report’s contents.  In addition, if the GAL is 
subject to cross-examination the Report’s admission is deemed 
harmless.  Justification is also seen to exist because of the GAL’s 
role; as noted, why would the legislature authorize or require 
them if the Report were not admissible or to be used? 
 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (unpublished), an intermediate Tennessee appellate court 
determined that additional evidence supported the trial court’s decision where the 
appellant argued that use of a Report containing hearsay was improper.  However, 
as in Hilyard, any error was harmless because the trial court did not exclusively rely 
on the Report.  The appellate court observed that the Tennessee Supreme Court had 
held, in a decision discussed next, that “exclusive reliance” on a Report would be 
error because a GAL Report “standing alone” is hearsay.  Id. (citing Toms v. Toms, 
98 S.W.3d 140, 144–45 (Tenn. 2003)). 
 246. 98 S.W.3d 140 (Tenn. 2003). 
 247. Id. at 144 (quoting TENN. R. EVID. 801). 
 248.  Id. at 144. 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  Id. Allowing a trial court to review a Report raises serious questions 
concerning fairness to any party opposing the GAL’s findings or opinion.  If the 
court is the fact-finder and has reviewed the Report, and the Report is not admitted, 
how can any party challenge it?  In addition, the fact-finder, in this case the judge, 
has been influenced by the Report.  However, the extent of the influence on the 
judge cannot be known, much less challenged, because there is nothing in the 
record documenting what the judge has considered or its impact on the judge.  
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While no Virginia court has addressed these issues, it is 
beyond argument, at least insofar as a traditional evidentiary 
analysis, that a Report is hearsay and contains hearsay.  It 
remains to be seen whether Virginia will justify a Report’s 
admission based on the rationale used in other states.  Whether a 
Report should be admissible, however, cannot be fully answered 
without considering the procedural due process implications of 
such admission on all the parties to the proceedings.  These 
issues and others will be addressed in Part VI. 
VI.  DUE PROCESS AND THE GAL 
Does the GAL’s expansive role implicate due process?  
Stated differently, is any party to the capacity proceeding 
unfairly prejudiced by what a GAL does to such an extent that it 
violates the United States or Virginia Constitutions?  Descending 
to particulars, is due process jeopardized when a Report is filed 
with and considered by the court despite the existence of 
additional evidence in the record?  Is due process offended 
when a GAL testifies?  Is due process impinged when a party is 
prohibited from cross-examining the GAL?  The answer 
depends on the circumstances.  However, it may be that in many 
instances due process is violated given the totality of the GAL’s 
role in the particular case.  For example, it may be that the mere 
failure to cross-examine a GAL may not rise to the level of a 
constitutional violation, but given the totality of the GAL’s 
participation, or the overall role of the GAL, due process was 
thwarted. 
The Virginia and U.S. Constitutions require that before 
anyone can be deprived of life, liberty, or property, one must be 
afforded due process.251  Due process embodies the concept that 
 
 251. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11; see also Commonwealth 
v. DeLapp, No. 0258-10-1 at 8 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opncavwp/0258101.pdf.   The Fifth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution provides in full:  
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
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the government’s authority is limited because it derives its 
powers from the people’s consent.252  Due process does not mean 
that a person’s interest, liberty, or property cannot be curtailed 
or taken; it simply prohibits unjustified or mistaken 
deprivations.253 
There can be little doubt that the Statute implicates the 
Respondent’s constitutional rights.254  It is a governmental 
mechanism for limiting or taking of both the Respondent’s 
liberty and property upon a finding of incapacity.  In fact, the 
mere filing of a Petition triggers the Commonwealth’s resources, 
pitting the state against the Respondent,255 and to some extent, 
those who have an interest in the Respondent’s welfare.256  While 
 
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
The Fourteen Amendment of the U.S. Constitution makes the Fifth Amendment’s 
due process clause applicable to the individual states. 
 252. Hood v. Commonwealth, No. 092402 at 11 (Va. Cir. Nov. 4, 2010) 
(unpublished) available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/opinions/opnscvwp/1092 
402.pdf. 
 253.  Id. (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978)). 
 254. See, e.g., Sim v. Wright, 403 N.W.2d 721 (Neb. 1987).   It is beyond the scope 
of this article to engage the intricacies regarding the distinctions between 
substantive and procedural due process.  Suffice it to say that the issues here 
involve procedural due process: whether the GAL’s role impacts the proceedings to 
such an extent that the proceeding is constitutionally defective or unfair to one or 
more of the parties.  Generally speaking, substantive due process involves a right or 
interest protected under the U.S. Constitution.  In order for the right or interest to 
qualify as substantive, it must be “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition,’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty 
nor justice would exist if it was sacrificed.’” McCabe v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 
508, 510 (Va. 2007) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) 
(internal brackets omitted)). 
 255. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court 
observed that a termination of parental rights case is analogous to a criminal capitol 
case.  The parents’ fundamental or “substantive” right to custody and care of their 
children is forever terminated.  Id. at 749.  The interests in a capacity hearing are 
comparable.  The court takes from the Respondent her right to live where she 
desires, to come and go as she wishes, and to do with her property what she wants.  
On the other hand, the Statute does provide that a Respondent, or other party, may 
petition the circuit court for a ruling that capacity has been restored, so to some 
extent, the losses under the Statute are not irretrievably lost as in a parental 
termination case.     
 256. A Respondent’s family members, if they have intervened, have due process 
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Respondent’s adult children have no substantive due process 
rights at stake,257 they do have fundamental procedural rights 
stemming from their position as parties (as Intervenor or 
Petitioner). 
The touchstone in procedural due process is fundamental 
fairness.  No state can deprive a person of liberty or property 
without affording procedural protections.  Significantly, the 
minimum requirements of procedural due process is a matter of 
federal law, and “are not diminished by the fact that the State 
may have specified its own procedures that it may deem 
adequate . . . .”258  The required procedures vary according to the 
nature of the individual’s rights at stake.259  Under Armstrong v. 
 
rights to the same extent as any other party in litigation.  All litigants have 
fundamental rights, such as the right to cross-examine witnesses.  In some states 
adult children are given preferential consideration concerning their parents, that is, 
the adult children are to be considered first before others when appointing a 
guardian or conservator.  See In Re Moses, 615 S.E.2d 573 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) 
(discussing Georgia’s statutory preference for ward’s adult child to be appointed 
guardian).  Under the Virginia Statute, adult children are treated no differently than 
anyone else.  
 257. Most courts have determined that the relationship between an adult child 
and his parent is not constitutionally protected.  California is the exception.  Such 
opinions, for the most part, have occurred in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases 
where a state actor/agent has deprived a person of a constitutional right.  In Smith v. 
Fontana, 818 F.2d. 1411, 1419 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987), the 
adult children sued, attempting to recover damages for the killing of their father by 
the police.  According to the court, the claim raised the threshold question 
concerning whether the children had a cognizable liberty interest under the due 
process clause.  Id. at 1418.  The court reasoned that the constitution protects the 
parent-child relationship when the children are minors and there was no logical 
reason for that protection to end when the children became adults.  Id. at 1419.  In 
Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005), the parents sued for loss of society after 
their adult child was killed by Chicago police.  Id. at 787.  The court of appeals held 
that the constitution did not allow a parent to recover, determining that the U.S. 
Supreme Court allowed recovery when the state actors (the police in this instance) 
intended to interfere with the relationship between a parent and their children.  Id. 
at 788‒89 (citations omitted).  Because the injury to the parents was only 
“incidental,” id. at 787, the parents could not recover.  In other words, the parents 
could have recovered if the police had killed their adult child with the specific 
intent to interfere with the parents’ relationship. See also Struck v. Cook Cnty. Pub. 
Guardian, 901 N.E.2d 946 (Il. Ct. App. 2009) (finding no substantive due process 
right of adult child to relationship with parent and upholding guardian’s denial of 
visitation).      
 258.  Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980). 
 259.  DeLapp, No. 0258-10-1 at 8 (“Due process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” (quotation omitted)). 
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Manzo,260 the Due Process Clause requires, at a minimum, the 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.  These rights are guaranteed.261  The rights 
do not create constitutionally protected interests, but they 
provide procedural safeguards against arbitrary governmental 
deprivation of certain interests.262 
In the context of a hearing or trial, due process requires 
notice of the issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to 
introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to respond 
to claims and evidence, and an impartial fact-finder.263 
The right to be heard and heard in a meaningful way 
encompasses the right to cross-examine witnesses.264  In Campbell 
v. Campbell,265 a husband in a divorce proceeding appealed 
because the trial court prohibited him from cross-examining his 
wife’s witnesses.266  The Court of Appeals reversed: “Virginia 
has recognized a fundamental right to cross-examination on a 
relevant matter to litigation, which applies in civil cases.”267  
Moreover, cross-examination is not a mere privilege but “an 
absolute right,” and “error of [such] magnitude is never 
harmless.”268 
It is evident then, that in the context of a capacity hearing, 
all parties—the Respondent, Intervenors, and the Petitioner—
have a right to be heard in a meaningful way.  Because due 
process is a flexible standard tied to the rights at stake in a 
particular milieu,269 consideration of these questions requires 
 
 260.  380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
 261.  DeLapp, No. 0258-10-1 at 8.  
 262.  Id. 
 263.  In re Chelsea C., 884 A.2d. 97, 102 (Me. 2005). 
 264. Cross-examination has been called the great engine of truth and, in fact, its 
utility has been recognized for 3,000 years.  Proverbs 18:17 (New Living Translation): 
“The first to speak in court sounds right – until the cross-examination begins.”   
 265. 642 S.E.2d 769 (Va. Ct. App. 2007). 
 266. The trial court prohibited the appellant/husband from cross-examining the 
wife’s experts solely because of time limitations.  Id. at 772. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 773 (quotations omitted). 
 269. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 
895 (1961).  In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747‒48 (1982), the U.S. Supreme 
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considering the GAL’s complete role, including presenting 
evidence, giving an opening or closing, examining witnesses, 
testifying, submission of reports, and perhaps most importantly, 
opining on the ultimate issue.  Before doing so, however, we will 
frame the issues, so to speak, by reviewing a well-reasoned 
opinion holding that a state statute violated due process to the 
extent that it prohibited a GAL from being cross-examined. 
In Kelley v. Kelley,270 the father/petitioner in a child custody 
dispute sought mandamus because a trial court prohibited him 
from cross-examining a GAL.  He also challenged a state statute 
prohibiting him from obtaining discovery from the GAL.  The 
petitioner argued that due process necessitated that the GAL, 
who had prepared a Report containing an opinion that the child 
remain in the mother’s custody, be subject to cross-
examination.271  The GAL argued that she could not be called as 
a witness, because she was “essentially, an attorney advocating 
in the cause.”272 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a trial court was 
constrained by due process, and the judge’s decision must be 
based on evidence that was properly before the court.273  
Therefore, any “investigator,” in this case the GAL, could not 
make a “secret report.”274 Moreover, there was no “backdoor to 
the courts for witnesses, investigators, or litigants.”275  Allowing 
a GAL to submit a report, to opine, and so forth without being 
 
Court ruled that New York’s burden of proof in the context of a hearing to 
terminate parental rights did not comport with the due process.  At that time in 
New York, a parent’s right to the custody of their children could be forever 
terminated based upon a mere preponderance of the evidence, a standard, said the 
Court, that did not comport with fundamental fairness of the Due Process Clause.  
Id.  The Court determined that the nature of the process, in other words, what 
procedures were due, involved a balancing test.  Id. at 745.  First, courts should 
identify the private interests affected by the proceeding; second, a court ascertains 
the risk of error created by the state’s chosen procedures, and third, it must identify 
the countervailing governmental interest in the state’s chosen procedures.  Id.  
 270. 175 P.3d 400, ¶ 1 (Ok. 2007). 
 271. Id. at ¶ 8. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at ¶ 11. 
 274. Id. (quoting Malone v. Malone, 591 P.2d 296, 298 (Ok. 1979)). 
 275. Id. 
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subject to cross-examination amounted to “private 
investigations by the court in assembling and receiving 
evidence, out of the sight and hearing of the parties, who are 
deprived of the opportunity to defend, rebut, or explain.  Due 
process simply does not exist in such an atmosphere.”276 
With this framework in mind, we turn to the due process 
implications concerning a Report’s submission as evidence, the 
GAL’s testimony, the lack of opportunity to cross-examine a 
GAL, the GAL’s role during trial, and Virginia’s attorney 
disciplinary rules as well as their interplay with due process. 
THE REPORT AND DUE PROCESS 
In Bates-Brown v. Brown,277 the appellant/father in a custody 
dispute claimed the trial court had violated due process when 
considering a Report containing hearsay.  Additionally, because 
the Report was filed a month after the hearing, the father argued 
that he was unable to challenge the GAL’s opinion by cross-
examining her.278  The Report referenced the GAL’s numerous 
discussions with a psychologist who was also unavailable for 
cross-examination.279  In addition to testifying, filing a Report, 
and giving her opinion that the appellant/father should not be 
awarded custody, the GAL cross-examined the father.280 
Because the father had the right to request the Report but 
did not, the court found no error.281  In addition, there was no 
 
 276. Id. 
 277. 2007-Ohio-5203 (Ct. App.) (unpublished).    
 278. Id. at ¶ 24. 
 279. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 280. Id. at ¶ 8.  As noted in the Introduction, this article essentially concerns 
human fallibility, bias, and personality issues.  It does not take much reading 
between the lines in this case to see a personality conflict between the father and 
GAL.  The father claimed that the GAL had not performed her statutory duties, in 
part, because she did not meet with him personally during the pendency of a 
certain motion.  Id. at ¶ 30.  The court dismissed the argument, noting that while the 
GAL did not personally interview the father during the pendency of the motion, 
she had spoken to him on the telephone, and prior to the motion had met with the 
father “countless” times.  Id. 
 281. Id. at ¶¶ 27, 28 (discussing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(C), which states 
that the GAL Report “shall be made available to either parent . . . not less than five 
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indication, the court reasoned, that the trial court had actually 
considered the Report.282  The record revealed that the lower 
court’s decision was based on the evidence at trial (not the 
Report), including the GAL’s testimony.283 
As to the father’s due process challenge concerning his right 
to cross-examine, the appellate court observed that the Ohio 
Supreme Court has held that “‘a court errs when it receives 
testimony in the form of a guardian ad litem’s report,’” but only 
where the objecting party had no opportunity to cross-examine 
the GAL.284  As noted above, the father claimed that he did not 
have the opportunity to effectively cross-examine the GAL, in 
part because the GAL’s Report was submitted a month after the 
hearing.  The appellate court disagreed, reasoning that in 
addition to the fact that there was no evidence that the trial court 
ever considered the Report, the father had in fact cross-
examined the GAL at trial where she had “summarized her 
position verbally.”285  Therefore, there was no due process 
violation. 
In In re Chelsea C.,286 the appellant/mother also 
unsuccessfully claimed that her due process rights were 
offended when a trial court admitted a Report into evidence.287  
 
days before trial, upon written request.”) 
 282. Id. at ¶ 25.  The court’s ruling is suspect for many reasons, especially given 
Gilbert’s observations, discussed above at note 145, that a GAL substantially 
influences the entire course of the proceedings.  The appellate court stressed that 
there was no evidence that the trial court reviewed or considered the GAL Report 
submitted a month after the trial, but, practically speaking, what evidence could 
there be?  The trial was over.  What was the father supposed to do?  Could he file a 
motion with the trial court asking the court to disclose whether it had reviewed the 
Report?  Moreover, why have a Report if the court was not going to review or 
consider it?     
 283. Id. at ¶ 23.  The totality of the evidence was testimony from the mother, 
father, the maternal grandmother, and the GAL.  Id. at ¶ 7. 
 284. Id. at ¶ 24 (quoting In re Seitz, 2003-Ohio-5218, ¶ 27 (Ct. App.), which relies 
on In re Hoffman, 97 Ohio St.3d 92, 2002-Ohio-5368)). 
 285. Id. at ¶ 29. 
 286. 884 A.2d 97, ¶ 1 (Me. 2005).  This was not a child custody dispute, but a 
parental termination case.  As discussed at note 256, under Kramer the mother had 
significantly greater constitutional rights, namely, a liberty interest under the U.S. 
Constitution in the custody of her children.  
 287. In 2002, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4005(1)(D) was amended to allow a 
trial court to admit a GAL Report into evidence.  884 A.2d 97, ¶ 9.  The statute says 
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The Report contained “highly critical” hearsay statements made 
by the mother’s former landlord and the child’s physician.  The 
statements called into question the mother’s parenting skills and 
cognitive abilities, and the GAL concluded the mother was 
unable to keep the child safe.288  The appellant claimed that even 
if the Report were admissible,289 due process required the 
hearsay to be redacted.290 
Because Maine’s legislature had granted trial courts 
discretion to admit Reports, the appellate court found no 
violation of the mother’s rights despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Kramer that in parental termination cases the parents be 
afforded the utmost procedural protections.291  The court noted 
that there was no doubt that the legislature could authorize 
hearsay exceptions, and Maine had expressly done so by 
allowing trial courts to admit Reports.  In addition, the 
legislature had impliedly recognized the need for a Report’s 
admission by authorizing a GAL to have access to otherwise 
confidential information and to conduct interviews.292  Finally, 
due process had not been offended because a GAL is a 
“disinterested party and an agent of the court,” and nothing 
precluded the mother from producing witnesses to rebut the 
GAL’s Report.293 
In contrast to Brown and Chelsea, the appellant/father in 
Miller v. Miller294 successfully argued that he was denied due 
process because the trial court had refused his request to cross-
examine a GAL.295  Significantly, the Report had been produced 
to the parties’ attorneys, and the witnesses referenced in the 
 
the court “may” do so.  
 288. Id. at ¶ 5.  
 289. The court stressed that Section 4005(1)(D) authorized the Report’s 
admission.  Id. at ¶¶ 7, 9.   
 290. Id. at ¶ 15. 
 291. Id. at ¶ 11. 
 292. Id. at ¶¶ 8‒9. 
 293. Id. at ¶ 14. 
 294. 671 So. 2d 849, 850 (Fla. Ct. App. 1996). 
 295. Like the GAL in Brown, the GAL cross-examined witnesses at the trial, 
including the appellant.  Id. at 851.  The decision further notes that “Florida law 
allows the GAL to participate actively in the trial of a change of custody case.” Id.  
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Report were available at trial and were cross-examined by the 
appellant.  Given these safeguards, the appellee/mother argued 
that the appellant had not been prejudiced.296 
The trial court permitted the GAL to orally give her Report; 
however, the court did not permit the GAL to “testify” or be 
cross-examined, reasoning that “I’m not going to be able to get 
lawyers to operate as guardian ad litem if I start subjecting them, 
you know, to cross-examination by all the lawyers in cases.”297  
As in Chelsea and Brown, the trial court viewed the GAL as an 
“independent individual who is giving a position as to what 
they think is in the best interest of the child . . . .”298 
The appellate court observed that the trial court had relied 
on the GAL’s Report to change custody when the children had 
lived with the father for eight years.  In addition, the Report 
contained hearsay and the GAL’s recommendation.299  
Moreover, it did not matter that the witnesses mentioned in the 
Report were available at trial and had actually been cross-
examined because “[i]t is a fundamental right in this country to 
confront one’s accuser and to examine evidence the trial court 
relies upon to reach a decision.”300 
As seen, a due process challenge based on a Report 
containing hearsay is often futile if the party had the 
opportunity to cross-examine the GAL.  Due process is 
considered satisfied if a GAL is subject to cross-examination 
because the GAL’s availability is viewed as curing any potential 
prejudice.  In addition, the GAL’s role as investigator, agent of 
the court, and an “independent” or “neutral party” legitimizes 
the Report’s admission. 
Such justifications do not adequately consider the GAL’s 
impact as accurately observed in Gilbert and Kelley, nor do they 
sufficiently recognize a party’s fundamental right to cross-
 
 296. Id.  
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id.  
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examination.  In addition, the fact that a GAL is subject to cross-
examination does not fully take into consideration the purposes 
underlying exclusion of hearsay, namely that out of court 
statements made by absent witnesses are unreliable and 
untrustworthy.  Hence, the fact that a party may cross-examine a 
GAL regarding statements that out-of-court witnesses made to 
the GAL obviously does not allow for confrontation of those 
witnesses.  It also does not give the fact-finder the opportunity 
to judge the absent witnesses’ credibility. 
In situations where witnesses are at trial but the GAL is not 
subject to cross-examination, the challenging parties still operate 
with one hand tied behind their backs.  They may challenge the 
witnesses and their statements as contained in the Report, but 
any meaningful challenge must include the right to confront the 
GAL. 
The fact that states legislate hearsay exceptions and enact 
laws authorizing appointment of GALs does not in itself mean 
that due process has been satisfied.  Under Kramer and its 
progeny, courts are required to engage in a balancing test to 
ascertain whether the procedures are constitutional.  Some 
courts like Brown and Chelsea inappropriately defer to the state.  
Due process requires courts to weigh the interests and rights of 
the individuals against the state’s interests in the procedures in 
place, and mere convenience is insufficient if the right is 
substantial. 
As noted, the Virginia Statute does not require the Report to 
be served on any party.  The Report is merely filed with the 
court, with no time requirement for submission.  In addition, the 
Statute is silent as to whether any party has a right to view its 
contents.301 Consequently, any party disputing the GAL’s facts 
or opinions as set forth in the Report may have no adequate 
 
 301. It would be surprising if any Virginia court would ever prohibit any party 
in a capacity proceeding from reviewing the Report and to do so prior to the 
hearing (assuming it has been compiled at that time).  However, there is no such 
statutory requirement.  And given the fact that the Statute does not mandate that 
the Report be served on the parties, nor specify when the Report is to be filed, the 
safest course would be to amend the Statute.   
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opportunity to do so.  Reports are often filed on the eve of the 
hearing or trial and as often, perhaps, the GAL opines at the 
trial.  Such uncertainty compromises the proceeding’s integrity.  
Requiring timely service on the parties would ameliorate some 
of the detrimental impact.  At a minimum, the parties should 
have the Report in time to subpoena rebuttal witnesses.  Without 
such requirements, the court and its surrogate decision-maker, 
the GAL, have too much discretion. 
In summation, due process is called into question when a 
Report is admitted because the Report itself is hearsay, contains 
hearsay, and under Virginia law a party has constitutional right 
to challenge evidence and confront witnesses.  As we shall see in 
more detail to follow, constitutionally sufficient procedures are 
placed in greater jeopardy when a GAL testifies.  In the final 
analysis, admitting a Report and permitting a GAL to testify tips 
the balance to the offending side of the due process scale. 
DUE PROCESS AND GAL TESTIMONY 
Due process is further implicated when a GAL participates 
as an advocate (cross-examining, introducing evidence, giving 
an opening/closing, and so forth) and as a witness in the same 
proceeding.302  The question is should a GAL be permitted to 
testify and act as an advocate consistent with due process?  Even 
if due process is considered to be satisfied, are there other 
considerations that would or should prohibit the GAL from 
assuming the roles of both advocate and witness?  As addressed 
in the next subsection, the attorney disciplinary rules prohibit a 
lawyer from testifying and acting as an advocate in the same 
proceeding.  These rules were implemented for the protection of 
opposing parties (i.e., fairness)303 and for appearance purposes; 
 
 302. At this point, we reference the observation made at the outset in note 14 
concerning the primary issues raised herein and how these issues can be 
formulated.  Although we have repeatedly touched on this issue and though much 
ink has spilled, this study now arrives at the point where the questions as initially 
formed can be more definitively answered: (1) How much of an attorney is the 
GAL, and (2) how much of a client is the client?  
 303. As noted, GALs often testify.  It is rare when anyone challenges whether a 
13.2_EDDLEMAN_PRINT.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2012  6:46 AM 
2012] DUE PROCESS AND THE GAL 201 
when an attorney testifies in the same proceeding in which she 
acts as an advocate, the trial appears to be tainted. 
Whether GALs may be said to have testified without 
offending due process depends upon a virtual metaphysical post 
hoc justification by appellate courts.  As seen from the foregoing 
discussion, courts legitimize GAL conduct by reviewing the 
record to ascertain if independent evidence exists over and 
above what the GAL submitted either by way of testimony or 
the Report.  Thus, even if testifying and advocating is considered 
improper, if independent evidence exists in the record 
substantiating the GAL’s testimony, then no manifest injustice 
will be found. 
The courts also inspect the record to ascertain if the GAL 
functioned as an advocate in the traditional sense.  In many 
cases, it is not difficult to locate evidence that the lawyer who 
was appointed as a GAL was not acting as a lawyer/advocate per 
se because the attorney was appointed as GAL, functioning as an 
arm of the court.  That being the case, the GAL will be allowed 
to take an active advocacy role, testifying, opining, and cross-
examining witnesses; it will not be deemed constitutionally 
infirm to do so because of the unique role a GAL occupies in the 
proceedings. 
On the other side of the equation, the justification continues 
by finding that the ward is not a “client” as that term is used in a 
pure attorney-client relationship.304  And if there is no client, the 
GAL will not be deemed to have run afoul of the disciplinary 
rules prohibiting attorneys from acting as advocates and 
witnesses in the same proceeding, and neither will due process 
be offended.  Essentially the courts are struggling with the many 
hats GALs wear, resulting from the fragmented statutory and 
 
GAL may testify without violating the disciplinary rules.  This is because the GAL 
is seen to be wearing not her attorney hat but acting in the capacity as a GAL 
(whatever that means).  In other words, if the GAL is acting as GAL and not as an 
advocate for one of the parties, then the disciplinary rules do not apply.  This is 
discussed further below.  
 304.  As seen below, that approach does not fully consider the parameters or 
purposes of the disciplinary rules, nor comport with the realities of a GAL’s role.  
We will also show that a violation of the disciplinary rules implicates due process.   
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common law schemes. 
Two proto-typical cases for addressing these issues are S.S. 
v. D.M. (“D.M.”),305 and In the Interests of K Children: D.K. and B.K. 
(“K Children”).306 
In D.M., the appellant/mother appealed, averring that the 
trial court erred by permitting a GAL to act both as an advocate 
and witness.307  The GAL testified in a show-cause hearing 
involving the adoption of the mother’s child by the appellee, the 
mother’s aunt.  The appellate court found that the GAL’s 
testimony was “devastating” to the appellant, but concluded 
that there was no manifest injustice. 308 
The GAL’s role in this case was extensive.  At the hearing, 
he explained and commented on the evidence, argued his own 
credibility,309 and rendered an opinion that “went to the heart of 
the adoption proceeding.”310  The GAL further opined on the 
ultimate issue: the appellee should be allowed to adopt the 
child.  If that were not enough, he also opined that the appellant 
lacked the requisite parenting skills.311 
The appellant argued that the GAL’s roles as advocate and 
witness prejudiced her because the GAL’s credibility was 
enhanced in the court’s eyes.  The GAL, the appellant argued, 
was court-appointed, purportedly neutral, and an attorney.312  
She further claimed that the GAL violated the District of 
Columbia’s disciplinary rules that prohibit an attorney from 
acting as an advocate and witness in the same proceeding.313 
The appellate court reviewed first the GAL’s testimony, 
then the statutory framework, and finally, the disciplinary rules. 
 
 305.  597 A.2d 870 (D.C. Ct. App. 1991). 
 306.  202 P.3d 577 (Haw. Ct. App. 2007). 
 307.  597 A.2d at 871. 
 308. Id. at 879. 
 309. “You have heard my testimony.” Id. at 878. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 878‒79. 
 312. Id. at 876‒77. 
 313. Id. at 877.  The disciplinary rules are discussed below. 
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The GAL testified that he had initially acted314 “in a kind of 
protective role” because the ward was only three years old.315  In 
the beginning, the GAL said, his efforts were to keep the child 
and mother together, but he had later changed his mind, 
becoming a “fan” of the appellee after observing how the child 
blossomed when living under her care.316 
The court next analyzed the statute317 authorizing the GAL’s 
appointment, noting that some commentators had observed that 
the GAL’s role is not always clear, and the law does not always 
distinguish between the roles of a neutral fact-finder, (who, in 
the court’s view did not make recommendations), and that of an 
advocate.318  In the District of Columbia,319 however, the statute 
was clear: the lawyer was not a neutral fact-finder, but was 
appointed to represent the child.320 
Despite this, the GAL/attorney wore both hats.  While 
monitoring the child’s visits with the mother, the attorney 
functioned as an investigator and testified at the adoption 
 
 314. In this instance, the lawyer was initially appointed for the neglect 
proceeding.  Subsequently, there was an adoption proceeding.  Id. at 874.  It is not 
clear whether the GAL was separately appointed in the second proceeding.  
However, the attorney acted as advocate and witness in the adoption proceeding.  
Id. at 873. 
 315. Id. at 874. 
 316. Id. 
 317. D.C. CODE § 16-918(b) (1989).  See note 319 infra for the statute’s language. 
 318. 597 A.2d at 875. 
 319. Like the Maryland Court of Appeals in Wills, discussed in Part III, the D.C. 
court relied on the statute’s language, finding that the lawyer was appointed as 
counsel, not as a GAL, for the child.  The D.C. statute provides in part that “in any 
proceeding wherein the custody of a child is in question, the court may appoint a 
disinterested attorney to appear on behalf of the child and represent his best 
interests.”  D.C. CODE § 16-918(b).    
 320. 597 A.2d at 875.  Even though the court found that the lawyer was 
appointed as the child’s lawyer, it observed that “the child was not a party in the 
usual adversarial sense.”  Id. at 879.  The parties were the mother/appellant and the 
appellee, the latter seeking to adopt the child and the former opposing the 
adoption.  The fact that the child is not an actual party “in the adversarial sense” 
hearkens back to the question previously raised: How much of a client is the client?  
If the child or ward is not strictly a party, and they are not, then does that status 
impact the GAL’s duties?  As seen, in Virginia a GAL may be required under 
Section 8.01-9 to file pleadings and engage in other advocacy-like functions on a 
ward’s behalf.  If the GAL has assumed an advocacy role, how far can she go?  Can 
she, at a capacity hearing for example, participate as a litigator by presenting 
evidence, making an opening, and so forth?     
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proceeding concerning his investigation.  After testifying, the 
GAL resumed his advocacy role.321  Accordingly, the court said, 
what the GAL did went well beyond his role, becoming an 
advocate for the appellee,322 a fact witness, and opining on the 
ultimate issue. 
The court next examined D.C.’s Disciplinary Rule 3.7, 
prohibiting an attorney from acting as an advocate and witness 
in the same proceeding.323  The court concluded that the 
disciplinary rules prohibited just the sort of conduct engaged in 
by the GAL, noting that separate counsel should have been 
appointed.324  Remarkably, however, the Court of Appeals found 
no prejudice to the appellant because the trial court supposedly 
did not uncritically adopt the GAL’s position.325  There was other 
evidence in the record supporting the decision.  Therefore, the 
GAL’s testimony was merely “cumulative.”326  Moreover, the 
court found the GAL to be honest.327  Finally, because the GAL 
was subject to cross-examination and no objection was raised at 
trial, the decision was upheld.328 
Sixteen years later, the court in K Children was presented 
with essentially the same issues.  The mother/appellant argued 
in a parental termination case that her due process rights were 
 
 321. 597 A.2d at 876‒77. 
 322. By all appearances, it seemed as though the lawyer was acting as the 
appellee’s attorney, although he was appointed as the child’s counsel.  So, again, 
the question arises: Who is the client?  Appearances—how the proceedings 
appear—can impact whether due process is satisfied.  Because a GAL is cloaked 
with neutrality and assumes her position by virtue of court appointment, if she 
appears to be siding with one of the parties, as they virtually always do, one of the 
parties can be at a tremendous disadvantage.  The disadvantaged party will be in a 
position (again appearances) of having to discredit an attorney who is viewed by 
the fact finder as being neutral, or an arm of the court.   
 323. In their Rules of Professional Conduct, D.C.’s Rule 3.7 is substantially the 
same as Virginia’s Rule 3.7, which is discussed below.  
 324. 597 A.2d at 878. 
 325. Id. at 879‒80. 
 326. Id. at 878. 
 327. Id. at 879.  The latter comment harkens back to Bottoms where the Virginia 
Supreme Court justified its decision based in part on the GAL’s testimony and 
credibility.  
 328. Id. at 880. 
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violated when the GAL donned his advocate and witness caps.329  
As in D.M., K Children recognized that the GAL’s opinion “went 
to the very merits of the case at bar,”330 but also found no error.331 
However, unlike D.M., K Children determined that the GAL was 
not appointed as the child’s attorney in part because the statute 
provided that separate counsel for the children could be 
appointed.332  In addition, the GAL was not appointed to act 
strictly as the children’s attorney because a GAL is defined as an 
“attorney for the suit.”333  Accordingly, the GAL was not the 
children’s advocate because he “represents the children’s best 
interests” as opposed to the children themselves.334 
Concerning whether a GAL could testify under Disciplinary 
Rule 3.7, the court noted the nationwide confusion surrounding 
the GAL’s role, and then proceeded to review a number of other 
state statutes.  In Delaware, the court explained, “an attorney 
guardian ad litem does not serve directly as counsel for the child 
under a traditional attorney/client relationship,”335 in contrast 
with GALs in states like Wyoming where they have the more 
traditional role of attorney with undivided loyalty and 
confidentiality to the child.336  A Delaware GAL was an officer of 
the court, appointed to protect the child’s best interests, and was 
not bound by what the child wanted.  In addition, a Delaware 
GAL acts as an “attorney for himself in his capacity as guardian 
ad litem charged with representing the best interests of the child; 
he does not act directly as attorney for the child in a pure 
 
 329. 202 P.3d at 580.  Although the court found no merited discussion on the 
mother’s point on appeal that she was denied due process, the court did discuss at 
length the prejudicial effect on the mother’s case of the GAL’s dual role allegedly 
taken in violation of the Hawaii Rules of Professional Conduct.  Id.  
 330. Id.  
 331. Id. at 583‒84. 
 332. Id. at 582. 
 333. Id. at 580 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 46 (8th ed. 2004)). 
 334. Id. at 583. 
 335. Id. at 582 (quotation omitted). 
 336. Id.  It may be recalled that the Wills court (discussed in Part III) found that 
the attorney there had not been appointed as a GAL but strictly as counsel for the 
child, which is why the attorney was not cloaked with judicial immunity and could 
be sued for malpractice by his client (the child).  
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attorney/client relationship.”337 
The court further observed that Delaware’s “convoluted 
idea” that a GAL “is an attorney for himself in addition to being 
an officer of the court,” was suspect.338  Nevertheless, Delaware 
had correctly decided the issue.339  Finally, K Children cautioned 
that GALs should provide independent factual information 
through the testimony and exhibits of others.  They must 
remember, the court cautioned, that a GAL “is not generally a 
witness, nor especially an expert witness.”340 
Both K Children and D.M attest to the reigning confusion 
surrounding GALs and the prejudice to any party challenging a 
GAL’s findings.  In D.M., the court found no due process 
violations in part because the record substantiated the trial 
court’s decision.  Similarly, the K Children court advised GALs 
and trial courts to ensure that the record included evidence from 
extra-GAL sources, cautioning that the GAL must remember 
that he or she is generally not a witness.  In other words, if at all 
possible, it is better to have independent evidence of the GAL’s 
opinions.  Finally, both decisions justify their holdings because 
the GAL was subject to cross-examination.341 
Turning to the Virginia Statute, one question is whether a 
GAL represents anyone.  If so, whom?  Or stated differently, is 
the ward a client in the pure attorney-client sense?  As noted 
above, one potential “client” under the Statute is the 
Respondent.  The second and third potential clients may be 
viewed as “ersatz” clients.  As K Children observed, a GAL could 
be representing herself as “client.”  Finally, the Respondent’s 
“interests” might be deemed the GAL’s “client.” 
Under the Virginia Statute, a GAL is appointed “to 
 
 337. K Children, 202 P.3d at 583. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id.  Similarly in Idaho, the court observed, a GAL represents the ward’s best 
interest and that may not be the same as what the ward desires.  Id.  
 340.  Id.   
 341.  In K Children, the court said the GAL’s testimony “was no more than his 
GAL report submitted orally and under oath.”  202 P.3d at 580.   
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represent the interests of the respondent.”342  Upon first reading, 
it might appear that the GAL acts as the Respondent’s attorney.  
After all the distinction between representing the Respondent’s 
interests and the Respondent herself is minute.  Nevertheless, 
the Statute does not say a GAL is appointed to represent the 
Respondent, but rather the Respondent’s “interests.”  So, 
arguably, the GAL is not the Respondent’s attorney.  This 
interpretation is further supported by Section 37.2-1003(B)(iii), 
requiring the GAL to determine if the Respondent needs counsel 
and if so, to bring that to the court’s attention.343 
Therefore, under the Statute the GAL apparently does not 
represent the Respondent as a client.  However, as seen from the 
discussion above in Part III, if Section 8.01-9 is read in 
conjunction with the Statute, the GAL may be required to file 
pleadings on the Respondent’s behalf and otherwise act as an 
advocate. 
If pleadings are required to be filed for the Respondent, the 
GAL must under the Statute notify the court that separate 
counsel is needed.  Thus, separate counsel could do whatever is 
called for in the way of advocacy for the Respondent such as 
filing certain pleadings.  However, what if Respondent’s counsel 
refuses to do so, and what if the GAL thinks that taking a certain 
course of action is in the Respondent’s best interests? 
Under common law, the Statute, and Section 8.01-9, the 
GAL must act in the Respondent’s best interests.  Recall that the 
Virginia Supreme Court said in Bottoms that the ward had no 
other independent participant in the proceeding, aside from the 
trial court, to protect the child’s interests.  If Respondent’s 
separate counsel will not act, then does the GAL have an 
obligation to do so?  If the GAL must file pleadings for the 
Respondent because the Respondent’s separately appointed 
counsel refuses to do so, then the GAL at the very least appears 
to be acting as Respondent’s counsel. 
 
 342.  VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1003(A) (emphasis added). 
 343.  In both K Children and D.M., the statutes similarly allowed for appointment 
of separate counsel to act in an attorney-client sense for the wards.   
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As discussed above, another potential client is the GAL 
herself.  A GAL may be viewed as representing herself in 
addition to representing a ward or a ward’s interest. 
The third client (or the second potential ersatz client) may 
be the Respondent’s “interests.”  As noted, Section 37.2-1003(A) 
requires a Virginia GAL to represent the Respondent’s interests.  
We have already noted that the Respondent’s “interests” does 
not mean that the GAL actually represents the Respondent, and 
while it stretches credulity to deem “interests” as a “client,” that 
is, nevertheless, what at least one jurisdiction has concluded,344 
and what others do implicitly. 
In the context of a capacity hearing, the GAL must take a 
position.  That is what she is appointed to do.  Typically that 
position is adverse to at least one of the parties.  Whether she is 
deemed the Respondent’s attorney, or deemed to be 
representing the Respondent’s interests (as client), or 
representing her own “position” as client, it appears that the 
GAL represents someone.  Therefore, when a GAL stands before 
the fact-finder opining on the ultimate issue, some party with a 
contrary position will inevitably be disadvantaged. 
Given that a GAL appears to represent someone, we next 
address the witness-advocate disciplinary rules in Virginia and 
how they impact the proceedings and parties in the context of 
the Statute.  We conclude that a GAL who testifies and 
participates as an advocate offends due process. 
DUE PROCESS AND VIRGINIA’S DISCIPLINARY RULES 
We have encountered the problems presented when a GAL 
does not testify.  The party opposing the GAL’s position has no 
viable means for countering an often “devastating” opinion, 
 
 344. One might assume that such a fiction is extreme.  However, a close reading 
of the cases reveals that while courts may not expressly identify a GAL’s client as 
the ward’s “interests,” that is nonetheless the implication as seen in K Children.  As 
noted, in the context of the Statute, such an interpretation derives from a straight-
forward reading of Section 37.2-1003(A) providing that a GAL is appointed to 
represent the Respondent’s “interests.”  
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whether the opinion is embodied in the Report or via testimony.  
The question then, from a due process stance, is whether 
allowing the GAL to testify is any better. 
Virginia’s disciplinary rules are mandatory and apply to all 
bar members, establishing minimum standards of conduct.345  
Breach of a disciplinary rule renders the lawyer subject to 
disciplinary action by the Virginia State Bar.346 
The disciplinary rules under discussion are inapplicable if 
the GAL has no identifiable client.  In other words, the witness-
advocate rules facially would not seem to apply if the GAL has 
no client because the rules prohibit an attorney from acting as an 
advocate for a client in a proceeding if the attorney will also be a 
witness.  If there is no client, then the GAL’s actions do not 
implicate the underlying purposes of the disciplinary rules,347 
which are to protect the client, the adversary, and the 
institutional integrity of the legal system as a whole.  On the 
other hand, as discussed above, a GAL, depending on the 
circumstances may be required by common law or Section 8.01-9 
to assume an advocacy stance in order to protect the 
Respondent’s interest.  Because a GAL may in some 
circumstances be required to assume an advocacy-type role, the 
underlying purposes of the witness-advocate rules are directly 
implicated. 
As noted, due process essentially concerns fairness.  What 
process is due is impacted when a GAL participates as both 
witness and attorney despite the fact that under the Statute the 
 
 345.  Estate of Andrews v. United States, 804 F. Supp. 820, 823 (E.D. Va. 1992). 
 346.  Id.; Personalized Mass Media Corp. v. The Weather Channel, 899 F. Supp. 239, 
242 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
 347. It is unclear whether the disciplinary rules apply to GALs.  For example, in 
Auclair, discussed above in Part IV, the court determined that the conflict of interest 
rule “necessarily excuses strict adherence to some of the rules of professional 
conduct.”  730 A.2d at 1270 (quotation and emphasis omitted).  In Auclair, the court 
appointed a GAL to represent three minors in a child custody dispute.  Although 
there were differences among the children as to what they wanted, the court ruled 
that the conflict of interest rules would not preclude the GAL from continuing the 
representation of all three children.  Id.  While Auclair’s holding is suspect in light of 
the Court of Appeals’ decision in Wills (discussed in Part III), the portion of the 
opinion in Auclair dealing with the disciplinary rules is not implicated by Wills.      
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GAL may not have a formal or identifiable client. 
Virginia Disciplinary Rules 3.7 (“Rule 3.7”) and 1.7 (“Rule 
1.7”) are commonly referred to as the witness-advocate rules.348  
As noted, these rules prohibit an attorney from serving as 
advocate and witness in the same proceeding.349  Rule 3.7, 
“Lawyer as Witness,” provides: 
 (a) A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in an 
 
 348.  While Disciplinary Rule 4.2 is not related to the issues presently under 
discussion, it is nevertheless implicated and merits mentioning.  Rule 4.2, 
“Communication with Persons Represented by Counsel,” provides: “In 
representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer 
in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized 
by law to do so.”  The rule raises a number of concerns unique to GALs.  It 
prohibits a lawyer that represents a client from communicating about the subject 
matter of the litigation with other represented persons.  As noted, the GAL may not 
initially have anyone as a “formal” client.  Upon the initial filing of a capacity 
proceeding, the GAL may not have any “advocacy” responsibilities to the 
Respondent, but as noted, that may change given the GAL’s common law 
obligations and Section 8.01-9.  In addition, under the Statute the GAL has an 
obligation to interview the Respondent in order to advise the Respondent 
concerning the proceedings as well as to obtain information regarding the entire 
scope of the proceeding.  Moreover, the GAL may at some point believe that the 
Respondent requires separate representation because the Intervenor or Petitioner 
may not adequately present to the court matters the GAL deems necessary for the 
court to make a determination in the best interests of the Respondent.  If after 
interviewing the Respondent the GAL believes it is necessary that the Respondent 
have separate counsel, for example, because the Respondent and the GAL differ on 
certain matters, then counsel appointed for the Respondent and the Respondent 
herself may be prejudiced because the GAL has previously interviewed the 
Respondent and the Respondent may have let the cat out of the bag, so to speak.  In 
other words, the Respondent may have disclosed to the GAL information that is 
prejudicial to the Respondent herself.  There is also the issue of the GAL 
communicating with other parties to the suit, either the Respondent or Petitioner.  
For example, if the GAL is required under Section 8.01-9 or common law to file 
pleadings or take positions the GAL believes to be in the Respondent’s best 
interests, essentially assuming the role of an advocate, and if the GAL has been 
communicating with other parties, then the GAL has the advantage of having 
obtained information from the other parties, information that the Petitioner or 
Intervenor may not have disclosed had they known that it would be used against 
them.  Lastly, the rule provides that a lawyer who represents a client shall not 
communicate with other represented persons unless she is “authorized by law to do 
so.”  As noted, the Statute requires the GAL to investigate virtually all the facts and 
issues pertaining to the Petition.  It could be argued that Rule 4.2 is inapplicable to a 
GAL, because the GAL is required by the Statute to communicate with all parties as 
part of her duties.  Whether this was intended is doubtful.  These questions 
highlight additional problems presented given the GAL’s role as now practiced.                    
 349.  Estate of Andrews, 804 F. Supp. at 823 (referencing 5-101(B) and 5-102(A), 
the precursor rules to 3.7 and 1.7). 
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adversarial proceeding in which the lawyer is likely to 
be a necessary witness except where: (1) the testimony 
relates to an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony relates 
to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the 
case; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work 
substantial hardship on the client. 
Rule 1.7, “Conflict of Interest: General Rule,” provides in 
relevant part: 
 (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer 
shall not represent a client if the representation 
involves a concurrent conflict of interest.  A concurrent 
conflict of interest exits if: (1) the representation of one 
client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) 
there is significant risk that the representation of one or 
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client, or former client or a 
third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.350 
 (b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent 
conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may 
represent a client if each affected client consents after 
consultation, and: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes 
that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and 
diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the 
representation is not prohibited by law; (3) the 
representation does not involve the assertion of a claim 
by one client against another client represented by the 
lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before 
a tribunal; and (4) the consent from the client is 
memorialized in writing. 
Rule 3.7 protects three different but related spheres of 
interests: (A) the client; (B) the adverse party; and (C) the 
institutional integrity of the judicial system.351 
The client has a right to a lawyer who will act solely in her 
best interests.  When counsel is called to testify, the roles of 
witness and advocate are fundamentally inconsistent.352 If a 
lawyer testifies, she is obligated to do so in an objective and 
truthful manner; however as advocate for another, the lawyer is 
required to argue her client’s cause irrespective of the attorney’s 
 
 350. (emphasis added).  
 351. Estate of Andrews, 804 F. Supp. at 823.  
 352. United States v. Franklin, 177 F. Supp. 2d 459, 467 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
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independent knowledge or personal beliefs.353  When taking the 
oath, the lawyer places her own credibility in issue.354  
Consequently, an “actual” conflict of interest exists when a 
lawyer has independent factual information355 relating to the 
issues in the case where the attorney may be called to testify.356 
Rule 3.7 is also designed to protect the adversary.  When 
counsel testifies, she takes an oath that drapes her with 
credibility and trustworthiness unavailable to her opponent.357  
Thus, the testifying lawyer’s position is enhanced in the fact-
finder’s eyes.  Not only is the opposing party at a disadvantage 
because she is not promising to tell the truth, i.e., she has not 
taken an oath, but opposing counsel is forced into the position of 
having to cross-examine the testifying attorney.  If cross-
examination is foregone, then the opposing counsel’s testimony 
goes unchallenged.  Alternatively, if cross-examination occurs, it 
may appear as attacking a fellow bar member’s credibility.358 
Rule 3.7 also protects the institutional integrity of the 
courts.359  Courts are required to exercise a supervisory role over 
bar members in the adversarial context, and must protect against 
unseemly practices that appear to diminish the role of judicial 
system in the public eye.360  The appearance of impropriety 
arises when a lawyer acts as both witness and advocate.  
Because a vital interest exists in ensuring that the court 
 
 353. Personalized Mass Media Corp., 899 F. Supp. at 242. 
 354. Estate of Andrews, 804 F. Supp. at 824 (“[T]he rule guards against the 
danger of a jury according undue weight to the arguments of an advocate who 
testified under oath.”) 
 355. As noted, the Statute requires a GAL to gather information as part of her 
duties. 
 356. Franklin, 177 F. Supp. 2d 459, 467 (E.D. Va. 2001). 
 357. As discussed below, a GAL’s testimony is especially enhanced because the 
GAL has been court-appointed to act in the Respondent’s best interest in addition to 
taking an oath.  
 358.  The court in Estate of Andrews, 804 F. Supp. at 829, indicated that a lawyer 
who testifies puts his credibility at issue.  
 359.  Noting that the public has an interest in the “scrupulous administration of 
justice,” the Franklin court framed the question as, would continued representation 
by an attorney who may testify impede the integrity of the proceedings?  177 F. 
Supp. 2d at 464‒65 (citation omitted). 
 360.  Id. at 464. 
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proceeding is viewed as trustworthy and fair, it does not matter 
if the fact-finder is a jury or a judge; the concerns remain the 
same: to promote institutional integrity. 361  In addition, courts 
are not to engage in “hair-splitting nicety” when confronted 
with a motion to disqualify an attorney who may testify; it 
should resolve all doubts in favor of disqualification.362 
Rule 1.7(a) prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if a 
“concurrent conflict of interest” exists.  A concurrent conflict of 
interest includes a situation where the attorney has a personal 
interest affecting the client.363  As observed, when a lawyer has 
independent knowledge concerning the client’s cause and may 
be called as a witness, the lawyer has a legal obligation (and 
therefore a personal interest under Rule 1.7) to testify objectively 
and truthfully.364 The duty to testify objectively is fundamentally 
at odds with the attorney’s obligation to the client because she is 
required to abandon her advocacy role. 
Rule 1.7(b) allows the representation to continue if the 
attorney reasonably believes that the client’s representation will 
not be adversely affected.  However, the client must consent in 
writing after the lawyer explains the limitations of the lawyer’s 
personal interest in testifying objectively and truthfully. 
If the Respondent in a capacity proceeding is viewed as the 
client, the question arises as to how the lawyer could properly 
obtain consent from one whose capacity is suspect.  After all, 
one of the fundamental purposes of the proceeding is to 
determine if the Respondent is, in fact, incapacitated.  It would 
be difficult to imagine a situation where the attorney could 
obtain consent from a putative ward.  If it turns out that the 
Respondent is incompetent, then consent to the continuing 
representation would be negated. 
The interests that the witness-advocate rules are designed to 
promote are uniquely implicated in other ways in the context of 
 
 361. Estate of Andrews, 804 F. Supp. at n.2. 
 362. Id. at 464 (quotation omitted). 
 363. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2). 
 364. The lawyer has taken the stand and has promised to tell the truth.  
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a capacity proceeding.  If the Respondent is viewed as the client, 
she has a right, like any other client, to an attorney free of 
conflicts.  As noted, when a lawyer testifies, a conflict exists 
because the GAL’s personal interest requires the lawyer to 
testify objectively and truthfully.  Doing that, however, may 
ultimately jeopardize the Respondent’s interests. 
For example, take the situation where a Respondent prefers 
her independence; she believes she can properly take care of her 
estate and personal needs.  If the GAL disagrees, if the GAL 
believes the Respondent needs to be placed in a nursing facility, 
it is the GAL’s duty to render an opinion based on what she 
thinks best.  On the other hand, as an advocate, the GAL has a 
duty to do what the Respondent wants. 
The second and third areas protected by Rule 3.7 involving 
the adversary and institutional integrity are likewise particularly 
implicated in the context of the Statute.  As noted a party, such 
as the Petitioner or Intervenor, may be reluctant to “attack” the 
credibility of a court-appointed lawyer/GAL.  The cloak of 
neutrality is thick; the GAL’s role is ostensibly independent, and 
she acts in the best interests of a putative ward.  Moreover, 
attacking a GAL’s conclusions can appear to be questioning not 
only the credibility of another attorney, it can also be viewed as 
attacking or at least questioning the court itself.  After all, the 
court appointed the GAL. 
In addition, when a GAL renders an opinion it can 
especially impact the advocate-witness rules.  The GAL states an 
opinion and in the process may argue that her opinion is 
credible because it rests on her own testimony, which, in turn, is 
based on her own investigations—a court-imposed obligation.  
Again, the court’s imprimatur kicks in.  In other words, a GAL 
wearing her witness hat has direct personal interest in the 
proceedings aside from her own credibility.  As counsel 
appointed especially to watch over the Respondent’s interests, 
she was ordered to investigate the evidence and the Petition.  
She will undoubtedly represent (or testify) that she has fulfilled 
those obligations.  As the GAL said in D.M., “You have heard 
13.2_EDDLEMAN_PRINT.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2012  6:46 AM 
2012] DUE PROCESS AND THE GAL 215 
my testimony.”  And, as noted, it matters little if the fact-finder 
is a judge or jury.  The proceedings appear to be tainted, not 
only from a public perspective, but also from the perspective of 
the party on the short end of the GAL’s stick. 
All litigants have due process rights.  Due process 
considerations may require additional measures when the 
matters before a court involve the Respondent’s freedom as well 
as the interests of the Respondent’s family in the outcome.  As 
Gilbert accurately perceived, a GAL significantly influences the 
proceedings, notwithstanding the Virginia Supreme Court’s 
minimizing observation in Bottoms that a GAL’s opinion while 
not irrelevant, should not be disregarded.  The GAL’s role is far 
more significant.  The pronouncement in Bottoms ignores the 
GAL’s significant influence on all points touching a capacity 
proceeding.  The court in Gilbert accurately recognized that the 
Report and the GAL’s role become the ultimate standard.  Any 
party opposing the GAL’s conclusion is at a substantial 
disadvantage.  If the GAL is not subject to cross-examination, 
there can be no meaningful confrontation.  On the other hand, 
cross-examining the GAL means attempting to undermine a 
fellow bar member, one blessed by the court and clothed in her 
multi-colored cloak of neutrality.  The GAL’s closing argument 
in D.M. bears repeating: “You have heard my testimony.”365 
That says it all. 
The current procedures ought not survive a due-process 
challenge. 
VII.  PROPOSALS 
Virtually every state is struggling to clarify a GAL’s role, 
wrestling with constitutional issues and a host of practical 
complications.  Serious questions exist in Virginia and demand a 
legislative response.  The courts are not equipped to restructure 
the systemic changes needed, nor do they have the authority.  
The General Assembly will not likely consider abolishing many 
 
 365. D.M., 597 A.2d at 878. 
EDDLEMAN.PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2012  6:46 AM 
216 MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR [Vol. 13 
of the current practices as some have called for in other contexts 
because the GAL’s role is firmly entrenched in Virginia.  The 
remedies for many of the vexing issues the courts have 
struggled with nationally for decades lie with the General 
Assembly and encompass statutory changes. 
Therefore, we offer the following proposals: 
The Report should be submitted and filed under oath.  
Requiring the GAL to submit the Report’s contents under oath 
creates a statutory incentive for greater accuracy and objectivity. 
The Report should not only be filed with the Court, but 
there should be a requirement that it be served on all parties 
sufficiently in advance of the hearing.  In some states the Report 
is required to be filed five to ten days prior.  The Report, 
however, should be filed sufficiently in time to allow the parties 
to subpoena witnesses to either support or oppose the Report’s 
contents.  Even greater protections would result if a Report were 
treated as an expert report in civil cases where such reports are 
required to be filed in time to allow for depositions and 
responses. 
The GAL should be subject to all discovery, including 
interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and 
depositions.  Such a requirement would eliminate surprise at 
trial, and last-minute changes of opinions that often prove to be 
devastating to one of the parties. 
Upon filing of the Petition, the court should be required to 
serve notice to all parties concerning the GAL’s role.  The notice 
would include the fact that the GAL is not an advocate and does 
not represent the Respondent or any other party in a traditional 
attorney-client sense.  The notice should, in plain language, 
indicate that the GAL is required to render a personal opinion.  
The notice would inform all parties that a GAL advises the 
court, investigates, and ultimately informs the court as to what 
she thinks is best for the Respondent, irrespective of the 
Respondent’s own preferences, or those of any other party. 
The jury should also receive notice concerning the GAL’s 
role, including the fact that a GAL is not an expert.  In addition, 
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the GAL, while appointed to represent the Respondent’s 
interest, is only giving a personal opinion, and that opinion, as 
well as the facts therein, must be considered together with all the 
other evidence presented at the hearing; the opinion is not to be 
given any more weight because the GAL was court-appointed or 
because the GAL is a lawyer. 
The GAL may not participate as an advocate.  The GAL 
cannot present evidence either directly or indirectly by cross-
examining any party or witness.  The GAL cannot give an 
opening or closing. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
There may be instances when the questions raised herein 
are not implicated—where the outcome in a capacity hearing is 
fair to all.  On the other hand, it is no exaggeration to posit that 
latent in every case a significant possibility of manifest injustice 
exists.  The GAL’s role has evolved for centuries and without a 
doubt, a substantial factor contributing to the present disarray 
results from this haphazard evolution.  Irrespective of the 
causes, however, these matters require resolution. 
As the population ages, it is vitally important that the 
concerns presented herein be addressed and remedied.  
Moreover, the fact that Virginia courts have not considered most 
of the problems addressed herein does not mean they are absent 
in the Commonwealth. 
A judicial finding that an elderly person is incapacitated 
results in immediate restrictions on his or her freedom.  In many 
cases the motivation of family members in filing Petitions are 
highly suspect; they can be economically motivated or driven by 
petty family squabbles.  The elderly are subject to exploitation 
and, as we have seen, there are now in place procedures and 
laws that jeopardize their protection.  Because a GAL’s impact is 
so critical, and because there are significant maladies in 
connection with their use, the General Assembly should review 
the legal panorama and act now.  The suggested proposals will 
not “fix” everything, but they are a step in the right direction. 
